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The Duration and Indestructibility
of Private Trusts
George Downing
To a lawyer thumbing through random court opinions and legal
treatises in search of the rules governing trust duration and indestructibil-
ity, the law in this area must appear hopelessly out of focus. Consider,
for example, the bewilderment of the reseacher who had happened across
the following statements on trust duration:
Private trusts which concern individuals are limited in their dura-
tion. They can endure only for a life in being and twenty-one years
in addition.'
A trust is not invalid, either
in whole or in part, merely
THE AUTHOR (A.B., Gannon College, LL.B., because the duration of the
Western Reserve Umversity) is a former editor trust may exceed the period
of the Western Reserve land, Ohi. of the rule against perpetu-ities. 2
The utmost extent of a trust
at common law is limited by lives in being at its creation and for
twenty-one years thereafter. a
1. 1 PERRY, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 23 (3d ed. 1882) This statement was given without
citation of authority. In later editions of the treatise, the following qualifying phrase was
added: "It must be kept in mind, however, that this rule against perpetntiues only applies
to cases in which the power of alienation is suspended, and that the creation of a trust does
not necessarily result in such suspension, for the trustee may have the right to alienate."
1 PERRY, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 23 (7th ed. 1929). This latter phrase suggests that the
author regarded the Rule Against Perpetuities as controlling on the duration issue, a view
which has been rejected by most writers since the common-law rule has become established as
a rule against remoteness in vesting. See the discussion at note 41 infra. In states which have
adopted the New York statutory perpetuities system, a system based on the undue suspen-
sion of the power to convey a fee, Perry s view may still have some force. See note 10
nfra, and 1A BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 219 (2d ed. 1951)
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 62, comment n (1959)
3. Fitchie v. Brown, 211 U. S. 321, 329 (1908) This famous case, in which Professor John
Chipman Gray, the perpetuities expert, appeared as counsel for the appellees, involved the
validity of a will provision calling for the creation of a trust which was to last "for as long
a period as is legally possible, the termination or ending of such trust to take place when law
requires it." The Court held the trust valid on the ground that certain named parties were
intended to be the lives in being, although this had not been spelled out by the testator, and
that the trust, therefore, would automatically end within the permissible period. The case
has been criticized for its use of the language quoted in the text, the contention being that
Justice Peckham had misconceived the role of the Rule Against Perpetuities. Cleary, Inde-
structible Testamentary Trusts, 43 YALE L.J. 393, 399 (1934) But this critacsm is not alto-
gether justified, since at the time of this decision it was orthodox thinking that the Rule Against
Perpetuines, at least in its broader sense, did in fact limit the duration of trusts. See, e.g.,
1 PERRY, op. cit. supra note 1. Although the quoted statement from Fitchie v. Brown supra
is usually referred to as dictum, it would appear to rise somewhat above that level since the
necessity of a limitation upon trust duration is implicit in the Court's handling of the vague
will provisions. See, e.g., Fitchie v. Brown, supra at 333; see also the discussion of this case
in Comment, 34 Mic. L. REV. 553, 556 n.17 (1936)
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There is no objection upon principle to a trust which lasts longer
than the period of perpetuities4
A trust for private purposes must terminate within a life or lives in
being and twenty-one years. 5
[A trust with all interests vested may lawfully] continue beyond the
period [allowed by the rule against, perpetuties]. '
A private trust cannot be created to continue for a period greater than
that established in the rule against perpetuties.m 7
There is no rule, in the absence of statute, which limits the life of a
trust to any specific number of years.8
What accounts for the outright contradiction in these and many other
statements that have been made on the subject of trust duration, and why,
if there is no objection upon principle to a trust which lasts longer than
the period of perpetuities, have.,so many writers and courts thought other-
wise? In a general sense, these are the, questions which are to be con-
sidered in this article.9
4. LEACH, CASES ON WILLS 230 (2d ed. 1951).
5. Mercer v. Mercer, 230 N.C. 101, 103, 52 S.E.2d 229, 230 (1949), quoting from Amen-
can Trust Co. v. Wilamson, 228 N.C. 458, 463, 46 S.E.2d 104, 108 (1948). In the later
case of McQueen v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 234 N.C. 737, 68 S.E.2d 831 (1952), it was
argued on the authority of Mercer v. Mercer, supra, that a certain postponement of enjoyment
was void, for the reason that if given its intended effect the trust involved would by possibility
endure beyond the permissible period of lives in being and twenty-one years. Without
specifically overruling Mercer, the court held both the trust and the postponement of enjoy-
ment valid on the ground that there was no violation of the Rule Against Perpettuties, all
interests having vested within the required period. The court said that Mercer was beclouded
by a vesting issue and that the case was not therefore controlling. This decision virtually
overrules the quoted statement from the Mercer opinion. For strong criticism of the Mercer
case, see Payne, The Rule Against Perpetuitir and Its Application to a PrWate Trust, 1 CLaV.-
MAR. L REV. 59 (1952); Recent Decision, 48 MIcm. L. Ruv. 235 (1949).
6. 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS S 62.10, at 543 (2d ed. 1956).
7. 53 OHIO JulR. 2d Trusts § 72 (1962). But see 42 OHIO JUR. 2d Perpetuaties S 44
(1960), where it is more accurately said that "The operation of the common-law rule against
perpetuities is confined to invalidating interests which vest too remotely. It is not concerned
with the duration of interests or with their termination. Accordingly, the rule does not, in
itself, limit the time for which trusts may endure." The latter reference goes on to say that
the duration of ndestructible private trusts may be subject to some limitation.
8. 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPE TY § 408 (3d ed. 1939)
9. Other comment on the issues of trust duration and indestructibility may be found in the
following sources:
Treatises: Leach & Tudor, The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities, in 6 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.67 (1952); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 381 (1944); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 62 (1959); 1A BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 218 (2d ed.
1951); BOGERT, TRUSTS § 52 (3d ed. 1952); CAREY & SCHUYLER, ILLINOIS LAW OF FUTURE
INTERESTS §5 478-80 (1941); 70 C.J.S. Perpetuites § 27 (1951); FRATCImR, P R'E-
Turris AND OTHER RESTRAINTS 426-28 (1954); GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETtUI-
TIES ch. 4 (4th ed. 1942); KALEs, ESTATES, FUTURE INTERESTS & ILLEGAL CONDITIONS
& RESTAINTs IN ILLINOIS §§ 658-59, 732-39 (1920); LEACH, CASES ON WILLS 230-31
(2d ed. 1951); 5 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 5 772 (1962); RUBENSTEIN, INTRODUCTION
TO PERPB'tUITIES ch. 32 (1959); 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 62.10 (2d ed. 1956); SIMES, FUTURE
INTERESTs §§ 1391-93 (2d ed. 1956); 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 408 (3d ed. 1939).
Law Re vew Arttcles: Anderson, The Modern Rule Against Perpetuittes, 77 U. PA. L. REV.
862 (1929); Cleary, Indestructible Testamentary Trusts, 43 YALE L.J. 393 (1933); Leach,
Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REV. 638 (1938); Metz, Comment on the Application
of the Rule Against Perpetuities to the Duration of Private Trusts in Pennsylvana, 4 U. PITT.
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I.
THE PROBLEM OF TRUST DURATION
At the outset it should be pointed out that a rule limiting trust dura-
tion does not now exist in any jurisdiction which follows the common
law Rule Against Perpettuties.' ° Despite the multitude of off-the-cuff
dicta, new as well as old, which suggest that such a rule has long existed,"
there have been only a handful of decisions in which private trusts have
actually been invalidated because of their capacity for prolonged dura-
tion; and even those few decisions have since been overruled or dis-
approved by the courts which decided them.'2 The explanation for this
L. REV. 157 (1938); Morray, The Rule Against Prolonged Indestructibility of Private Trusts,
44 ILL L. REV. 467 (1949); Newman, Perpetuties, Restraints on Alienability, and the Dura-
tion of Trusts, 16 VAND. L. REv. 57 (1962); Payne, The Rule Against Perpetuites and Its
Applicatton to a Private Trust, 1 CLEV.-MAR. L REV. (pt. 2) 59 (1962); Scott, Control of
Property by the Dead, Part II, 65 U. PA. L. REv. 632 (1917); Note, 7 BAYLOR L. REv. 402
(1955); Note, 41 CALIF. L. REV. 549 (1953); Comment, 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 92 (1950);
Note, 23 CORNELL L. Q. 629 (1938); Note, 47 DICK. L. REV. 177 (1943); Comment, 34
MICH. L. REV. 553 (1936), Recent Decision, 48 MIcH. L. REV. 235 (1949); Comment,
24 TENN. L. REv. 1021 (1957)
10. See, e.g., 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 9, § 408; 5 POWELL, op. cit. sUpra note 9 5
722, and cases cited therein; Cleary, supra note 9, at 398.
In jurisdictions which follow the New York statutory perpeuities system, a system which
is based on the principle that the power to convey an estate in fee simple cannot be unduly
suspended, certain kinds of long-lasting trusts may be regarded as invalid in whole or in
part, especially if the beneficiary's power of alienation is restrained by statute. See generally
for a discussion and analysis of the New York system, Newman, supra note 9, at 60-75. See
also IA BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 9, § 219, and the supplements thereto, for a list of the
jurisdictions which have departed from the common-law perpetuties system and which have
statutes governing the related problems of duration and indestructibility.
While there have been no recent cases from common-law perpettuies jurisdictions in
which long-lasting trusts have been voided as against public policy, there are a number of
cases from such jurisdictions in which trusts exceeding the perpetuities period have been
sustained. See the cases collected by Cleary, note 9 supra, at 398.
11. In addition to the dicta already quoted (see notes 3 and 5 supra), see the numerous
dicta cited and quoted in IA BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 9, at 410-14, especially notes 54-57
and supplements thereto.
12. See, e.g., McQueen v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 234 N.C. 737, 68 S.E.2d 831
(1952), impliedly overruling Mercer v. Mercer, 230 N.C. 101, 52 S.E.2d 229 (1949)
Both cases are discussed at note 5 supra. See also Pulitzer v. Livingston, 89 Me. 359, 36 Ad.
635 (1896), overruling Slade v. Patten, 68 Me. 380 (1878) In Slade, a gift in trust was
made by the testator to his daughters and their respective heirs. No provision having been
made for an eventual termination of the trust, the court held that the trust created a "per-
petuty" and was void. After Professor Gray had severely attacked the decision on the ground
that there was no legal prohibition against the creation of an equitable fee in trust (see notes
18 and 19 infra), the Pulitzer court overruled Slade saying it could not be sustained either
upon principle or authority.
An exceptionally interesting case in which a private trust created for successive generations
of the settlor's issue was declared invalid ab tnto as a "perpetuity" is Barnum v. Barnum,
26 Md. 119 (1866) Although the court in Barnum seems to have been more concerned
with the suspension of the power of alienation over the trust property than with excessive
trust duration per se, the following language from its opinion is noteworthy-
If an estate be so limited as by possibility to extend beyond a life or lives in
being at the time of its commencement, and twenty-one years afterwards, during
which time the property would be withdrawn from the market, or the power over
[Vol. 16:350
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lack of direct authority for a rule limiting trust duration and for the many
recent statements that there is no need for such a rule can be found in
the analysis which the modern property and trust law experts have made
of the related problems of trust duration and indestructibility."8
The Modern Analysis of the Duratton Problem
The kind of prolonged duration with which this discussion is con-
cerned arises when a private trust in favor of named beneficiaries is
created in such a way that it may endure for a longer period than lives
in being and twenty-one years, even though the interests of all bene-
ficiaries must vest within that permissible period. 4 This situation fre-
quently occurs where a postponement has been imposed upon the last
taker's enjoyment of principal, as for example in the case of a- testamen-
tary trust created in favor of A, a bachelor, for life, and then in favor of
A's first born son in fee, with a direction to withhold principal from the
son until he attains the age of forty-five, income to be paid him in the
meantime. With this kind of trust limitation it is dear that there can
be no problem of remote vesting, since the interest of A's son will neces-
sarily vest during a life in being.'5 At the same time, however, it is also
the fee suspended, it is a perpetuity and void as against the policy of the law, which
will not permit property to be inalienable for a longer period. Id. at 169-70.
This decision was followed for a time by the Maryland courts, but ultimately was disapproved,
though not expressly overruled, in the case of Gambrill v. Gambrill, 122 Md. 563, 89 Ad.
1094 (1914). For a discussion of the Maryland decisions see GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST
PERPBTUITIES § 245.2 (4th ed. 1942).
13. Representative commentary on these subjects may be found in RESTATEMENT (SEc-
oND), TRusTs § 62, comments n and o (1959); 5 POWELL, op. cit. supra note 9, 5 772;
Cleary, supra note 9; Morray, supra note 9. Other authorities dealing with these related prob-
lems are listed at note 9 supra.
14. This article will deal only with the duration and indestructibility of private trusts hav-
ing named beneficiaries. Charitable trusts, which for policy reasons are permitted to endure
forever, and private trusts of a unique nature, such as "honorary" trusts, trusts for umncor-
porated associations, "business" trusts and employees' trusts, all lie outside of the scope of
the present discussion.
Since the Rule Against Perpemities is concerned only with the vesting of remote future
interests, and not with the duration or indestructibility of trusts, the perpetuities period is
used in the text illustration only for the sage of convenience. Actually, any rule which might
be fashioned to meet the problems of duration or indestructibility could in theory adopt as a
measuring period some period other than lives in being and twenty-one years, though it is
likely that any such rule would follow the perpetuities period. See discussion at pp. 370-71 and
pp. 375-76 mira.
15. It should be pointed out, in connection with limitations- of this kind, that the Rule
Against Perpetuities does indirectly limt trust duration by virtue of the fact that it limits the
number of successive interests which may be created in a particular estate. Thus, in a trust
limitation in favor of A, a bachelor, for life, then to A's children for their lives, then to A's
grandchildren for their lives, remainder over in fee to B, the life interests created in favor of
the grandchildren will be invalidated by the Rule Against Perpetuties and the trust term will
be shortened to that extent. In such a case, it is the fact that the trust may endure for the life
of A and then for the lives of his children, whose interest will vest within the permissible
period, that the trust may come under attack because of its capacity for prolonged duration.
For a general discussion of the role played by the Rule Against Perpetuities in indirectly
limiting trust duration see Newman, supra note 9, at 72-74.
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dear that if the postponement of the son's enjoyment is given its intended
effect, the trust itself may by possibility endure beyond the perpetuities
period - for a possible maximum period of a life in being and forty-five
years.
In situations of this kind, it has come to be the almost universal view
of the trust and property law experts that there is no need for a rule which
would invalidate the trust ab mtzo simply because of its capacity for long
duration. 6 In the opinion of these writers, it is of absolutely no social
or legal consequence how long private trusts last; they may go on forever
- or at least anything short of forever" - so long as the interests of
the beneficiaries are not otherwise fettered. Trust duration itself is an
entirely neutral phenomenon to these writers, and it is only when some
direct or indirect restraint is imposed upon the beneficiary's interest that
the law need take stock of the situation to determine whether any public
policies have been violated. The legal conceit usually employed to illus-
trate or justify this view is the capacity for long life that inheres in legal
fees. These writers argue that if a legal fee can in theory go on "for-
ever" if that is what successive generations desire, there is no reason why
an equitable fee should not be allowed to go forever if that is what suc-
cessive generations of beneficiaries desire.'8 As stated by Professor Gray-
"If land is devised to A in trust for B and his heirs, the Rule against Per-
petuites has no application. The trust is perfectly good. B's equitable
fee is no more objectionable because it may last forever than is a devise
of a legal fee simple; that too may last forever."' 9
But while these writers may regard duration itself as an irrelevancy,
they do concede that interests held in trust may be subjected to direct or
indirect restraints of a kind which cannot be easily mposed on legal in-
terests. Spendthrift provisions and postponements of enjoyments may be
16. In addition to the authorities cited at notes 2, 4, 6 & 8 supra, see also 5 POWELL, op.
.it. supra note 9, § 772; 2 TIFFANY, op. czt. supra note 9, § 408; Cleary, supra note 9; Mor-
ray, supra note 9; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 62, comments o, o (1959) Of
all of the authorities cited at note 9 supra, only two or three of the cited authors have sug-
gested that prolonged duration, as distinguished from prolonged indestructibility, may be
legally objectionable. See Metz, supra note 9, at 161; Comment, 18 U. CHI. L. REv. 92
(1952); see also Walsh, Indestructible Trusts & Perpetaues m New York, 43 YALE L.J.
1211, 1230 (1934).
17 Although it has been said by some authors that private trusts may go on forever in the
absence of restraints on termination (see, e.g., Gray's statement on the validity of an equitable
fee in trust at note 19 tnfra), it has also been said that there are rules, independent of the
Rule Against Perpetuities, prohibiting the creation of a trust for an indefinite succession of
lives or for an estate of inheritance. See, e.g., Newman, supra note 9, at 71 wherein it is
stated that "the duration of a trust is nevertheless limited by the rule that there can be no
trust of an estate of inheritance, that is to say, of a fee, or for an indefinite succession of
lives. " On the latter "rules," however, see contra GRAY, op. cit. supra note 9, §§ 191-99.
18. See, e.g., the language quoted in the text accompanying note 23 snfra.
19. GRAY, op. cit. supra note 9, § 236, at 241.
[VoL 16:350
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taken as examples of such direct restraints;2" reduced marketability of
equitable interests as an example of indirect, trust-imposed restraints."'
However, in the opinion of these writers, all of these restraints on the
interests of trust beneficiaries, whatever form they may take, can be kept
within socially acceptable limits by giving the beneficiaries the power to
"destroy" their trusts, i.e., to compel their termination, after the perpetui-
ties period of lives in being and twenty-one years has run its course.2 Thus,
in the example which has already been posed of.a trust to A, a.bachelor,
for life, then to A's first born son in fee, with directions to withhold prin-
cipal until the son reaches forty-five, most of the property and trust law
experts would concur that the direct restraints imposed by postponement
of the son's enjoyment can be kept within permissible limits by giving
the son the right to compel termination of the trust twenty-one years after
the death of A, his father. If the son chooses not to exercise that power
of termination and the trust continues for the maximum period envisioned
by the testator, that is of no legal or social significance.
The philosophy which underlies this modern approach to the
related problems of trust duration and indestructibility is aptly summar-
ized by one writer in the following language:
It should be noted that there is no limit to the length of time a trust
may endure. Any rule that exists is against prolonged indestructibility
and not against prolonged duration. Thus, if A by will leaves real estate
to B in trust to pay the income to C and his heirs, the trust will continue
for as long as C and his heirs forbear to compel termination. This may
be a period exceeding lives in being and twenty-one years. The trust is,
nevertheless, perfectly good. Similarly, if A leaves property in trust for
B, a bachelor, for life, then for the first-born son of B for life, remainder
to the X corporation in fee, the trusts may, and probably will, continue
throughout the life of B and the life of B's first-born son, who was not
alive at the creation of the trust. The trust is, nevertheless, valid. As
soon as B's first son is born and becomes su; jurts, the three beneficiaries
can join to compel the termination of the trust. Or two of them can
convey their interests to a third, who can then compel terminaton. Or
all three can convey to a stranger who can then compel termination.
20. For a.discussion of the validity of long-lasting spendthrift provisions directed at a bene-
ficiary's interest in trust principal on income, see GRiSWOLD, SPENDT RiFr TRusTs §
290-96 (2d ed. 1947); Ras'rA'rMN:rr (SEcoND), TRusTs § 62, comment p, § 153 (1959).
21. See language quoted in the text at notes 56 and 57 stira. One writer has described an
"indirect" restraint in this way-
An indirect restraint arises when an attempt is made to accomplish some pur-
pose other than the restraint of alienability and the incidental result of the accom-
plishment of that purpose would be that the instrument would restrain practical
alienability. Such restraints are called indirect because nothing is said in the creating
instrument about restricting alienability and the creator of the instrument did not
have the restraint of alienability as his primary object. Metz, supra note 9, at 159.
(Emphasis added.)
22. For a discussion of this "modern" point of view, see, in addition to the language quoted
in the text accompanying note 23 wufra, Cleary, supra note 9, at 395-403; RESTATEMENTr
(SECOND), TRUSTs § 62, comments n, o (1959)
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The crucial quality of indestructibility thus will end within the lifetime
of B plus twenty-one years. Actual duration of the trust is immaterial.
This important distinction between indestructibility and potential
duration is precisely analogous to the distinction between inalienability
and long-term retention of title. The law forbids restraints on aliena-
tion. It does not compel periodic alienation. Property must be alienable
though it need not be aliened. Similarly, trusts may have to be destruc-
tible though they certainly need not be destroyed.23
Weaknesses zn the Modern Approach to Trust Duratton
and Indestructibility
If one can accede to the social policy premise on which this modern
approach to trust duration is constructed, and can put out of mind the nu-
merous practical problems which beset its Implementation in actual cases,
24
the logic and "doric simplicity" of the approach have an immediate ap-
peal. Once it is assumed, as these writers have apparently assumed, that
the ancient common law policies favoring the free circulation and maxi-
mum utilization of property are concerned only with unfettering the inter-
ests of individual property owners - of making those individuals the
"masters" of their property - it can hardly be gainsaid that a rule em-
powering trust beneficiaries to terminate their trusts after the perpetuities
period has elapsed. accomplishes all that the law requires. A trust bene-
ficiary whose interest has been restrained by a postponement of enjoyment
can hardly be heard to complain of that restraint if he has the legal power
to terminate his trust and render the postponement Ineffective. By the
same token, a trust beneficiary who complains that his equitable interest
will not command the same price on the market as its legal and "undi-
vided" equivalent " is not deserving of much sympathy if he has the power
to merge the legal and equitable titles in his interest by compelling a
termination of the trust. Such restraints, so far as the beneficiary him-
self is concerned, are not restraints at all if he has the power to rid him-
self of them. Under such circumstances, and taking the narrow view of
public policy which has just been stated, the writers referred to seem quite
correct in saying that the law should not be required to go the final step
and automatically terminate trusts after lives in being and twenty-one
years; it should be enough if the law provides individual beneficiaries
with the means of accomplishing that result by their own action.
But all of this discussion, in this writer's opinion, assumes too much.
23. Morray, supra note 9, at 470.
24. See the discussion at pp. 379-83 infra. Chief among the practical difficulties which beset
the use of a rule against prolonged indestructibility is an independent rule of trust law which
requires al beneficiaries to join in any petition for termination of a trust. See authorities
cited at notes 112-14 infra. Armed with this rule, one writer has provided a sort of "short
course" for trust draftsmen on how to make trusts indestructible even in the face of a rule
prohibiting prolonged indestructibility. See Cleary, supra note 9, at 403-12.
25. See the language quoted in the text at note 56 infra.
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Is it really fair to conclude, as the modern writers have in effect con-
cluded, that the common law policies favoring the free circulation and
maximum utilization of property are concerned only with unfettering indi-
vidual property interests? Or do those policies cut deeper, and concern
themselves in a larger and more fundamental sense with the interests
which society itself has in the free circulation and maximum utilization
of property? And if these policies are concerned primarily or funda-
mentally with the interests and needs of society itself - using rules that
unfetter individual interests only as a means for achieving a greater end2"
- can it be said with conviction that granting individuals the power to
unfetter their own interests will perforce and in all cases satisfy society's
interest in the free circulation and maximum utilization of property?
These are the difficult policy questions which the modern writers and
courts seem too often to have glossed over in analyzing the related prob-
lems of trust duration and indestructibility.
The Policy Underpinnings of the Rule Against Perpetutes
It might be said with some justification that any question which asks
whether the public policies favoring the free circulation and maximum
utilization of property are concerned with the interests of society or with
the interests of the individual should be dismissed as so much rhetoric.
Obviously any "public policy" is concerned with the interests of the in-
dividual as well as with the interests of society as a whole. Nonetheless,
the question seems a valid one, for if nothing else it brings to mind the
immutable system of priorities which has always governed the adoption
of rules regulating property interests in our society. Stated briefly, that
system is that the interests and needs of society as a whole must be served
first, and that the interests of the individual members of society must be
compromised and subordinated where that is essential to the achievement
of some greater social end.
Although many rules of property law bear testimony to this system of
priorities," nowhere is this balancing of private and public interests more
clearly illustrated than in the rules which have been devised to regulate
the human predilection for imposing long-lasting contrcls on the use and
devolution of property. The earliest annals of the common law have re-
26. See the discussion of the Rule Against Perpenuties' evolution at pp. 358-60 minfra, and
the discussion of the American Law Institute's evaluation of the rule s social and economic
functions at pp. 361-63 intra. See also 4 RESTATENMNT, PROPERTY, Introductory Note
2129-33 (1944); Metz, supra note 9, at 159.
27. Rules pertaining to the condemnation of private property by public authorities, to the
regulation of " publc" nuisances on private property, and to the use of private property in a
way that does not impinge upon the civil rights of. other individuals, are just random ex-
amples of the many rules regulating the use of private property which the courts and legis-
latures have devised to meet what they have considered to be the pressing needs of the com-
munity or society as a whole.
1965]-
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corded the incredible lengths to which men of means have gone to
memorialize themselves in long-lasting property settlements;28 and the
same annals have recorded the hostility which the courts have from earliest
times shown toward these efforts to tie up property for generations -
a hostility bred not only from a desire to unfetter the property interests
of individuals, but also from a desire to secure the competitive and pro-
gressive basis of society itself.29 At the beginning the efforts of property
owners to restrict the use and devolution of property took the form of
direct and naked restraints on alienation, as, for example, in the case of
conditions calling for the immediate forfeiture of estates in fee tail upon
the then owner's attempt to bar the entail.3" Direct restraints of this
kind, "clauses of perpetuities" as they were called,3' were soon invalidated
outright by the common law courts on the ground that they did "befight
against God"32 and pretended "to such a stability in human affairs as the
nature of them admit not of. "" But to take the place of these invalid
direct restraints, property owners and their conveyances then began to fash-
ion more subtle and ingenious devices for fettering the interests of future
takers. One such device, a device which came into common currency
28. A concise history of these efforts is given in an introductory note on the Rule Against
Perpetuities in 4 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY, Introductory Note 2123-29 (1944) See also
GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY (2d ed. 1895); 1 POLLOCK & MAIT-
LAND, HISTORY OP ENGLISH LAW § 29-49 (2d ed. 1911)
29. It is generally agreed that "a strong bias in favor of alienation" has existed at common
law since about the 13th Century. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, op. ct. supra note 28, at 18-19.
Paeans to this "bias" have been sung by many legal historians, and it is universally ac-
knowledged to be one of the singular glories of the common law. The most scholarly ac-
counts of the development of this bias and its effect on the formulation of rules restricting
direct and indirect restraints on alienation are to be found in GRAY, op. cit. supra note 28;
GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES §§ 123-71 (4th ed. 1942); see also 4 RESTATE-
MENT, op. cit. supra note 28, at 2123-33.
For a discussion of the economic and psychological motives which cause men to impose
dead hand restraints, and of society s objectives in policing such restraints, see McDoUGAL &
HABER, PROPERTY, WEALTH, LAND 246-49 (1948) See also Scott, Control of Property
by the Dead, 65 U. PA. L. REV. 527, 632 (1917).
30. 4 RESTATEMENT, op. cit. supra note 28, at 2124.
31. MORRIS & LEACH, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 4 (1956).
32. This remark is attributed to Lord Edgerton, who is said to have used it in a perperuities
case decided at the Trinmty Term of 1599. CARY, CASES IN CHANCERY 11 (1820).
33. Lord Chancellor Nottingham in the Duke of Norfolk s case, 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 31, 22 Eng.
Rep. 931, 949 (1683). It was not until this famous case that the judicial philosophy regarding
property fettering received any degree of articulation. Before this time the "bias" in favor
of free alienation was expressed more in conduct than in words. See 2 POLLOCK & MAIT-
LAND, op. cit. supra note 28, at 18-19; GRAY, op. cit. .rupra note 28, S 21.
On the judicial invalidation of conditions of forfeiture, Gray remarks: "But in 33 Ass.
pl. 11 (1359), Green, J. said that a condition not to alien upon a feoffment in fee was void
and in 21 Hen. VI. 33, pl. 21 (1443), Paston and Yelverton, JJ., agreed that such a con-
dition was bad." Id. at § 19. There is a technical distinction between a clause calling for for-
feiture upon alienation and a direct restraint upon alienation, but the distinction is not a
material one. Both are considered in the broad sense to be subject to the "rule against direct
restraints on alienation."
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after the famous case of Pells v. Browne4 held future interests to be in-
destructible, was the remotely vesting future interest. Strictly speaking,
interests of this kind umposed no direct restraints on the alienation of
property since the estates to which they attached could be freely conveyed
by their present owners.n Nevertheless, the courts came to realize that
these remotely vesting interests could accomplish quite as much mischief
in an indirect or practical way as the conditions of forfeiture and other
restraints of old had accomplished in'a direct way. Thus, while the courts
could appreciate the present owner's theoretical freedom of alienation,
they were also practical enough to realize that these remotely vesting
future interests could lessen the value of the present taker's estate and in-
directly inhibit its alienation by virtue of the fact that few purchasers
would.-be willing to pay roundly for an estate that would come to an
abrupt end at some indeterminate future date."6 The courts also realized
that the present owner of an estate would not be inclined to invest heavily
in the improvement of his estate, %.e., put it to its maximum use, if those
improvements would pass as a windfall to some future taker'
The eventual result of these judicial misgivings over the harmful
effects which remotely vesting future interests could have upon the free
circulation and maximum utilization of property was the adoption of a
rule invalidating any future interests which could by possibility vest at
some "inconvenient" time in the future!8 Use of this test of "inconven-
ience" represented a sort of compromise by the courts - a compromise
giving recognition not only to the fact that remotely vesting future in-
terests only indirectly restrain alienation, but also to the fact that the
34. Cro. Jac. 590, 79 Eng. Rep. 504 (1620). In Manning's Case, 8 Co.'Rep. 94b, 77 Eng.
Rep. 618 (1609), the court had declared an executory interest in a chattel real to be inde-
structible at the instance of the first taker.
35. Gray was emphanc on this point: "[a] future interest is not a restraint on the alienation
of an estate unless the contingency upon which the future interest depends is itself the aliena-
tion of the estate. The owner of an estate subject to a future interest can grant all that he has
got, and the grantee has everything that the grantor would have had if the transfer had not
been made." GRAY, op. cit. supra note 28, § 8. See also GRAY, op. cit. supra note 29, § 2.
36. See, e.g., 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 9, § 392; 4 RESTATEMENT, op. cit. supra note
28, at 2131-32; Fraser, The Rationale of the Rule Against Perpetuities, 6 MINN. L. REV. 560
(1922). A lucid thumbnail sketch by Professor Simes of the practical reasons which led to
the adoption of the Rule Against Perpetuties is given in SIRES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE
DEA)D HAND 36-38 (1955).
37. See authorities cited note 36 supra, especially 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 9, § 392.
38. The courts adopted as their method [of dealing with remotely vesting future in-
terests] the customary procedure of the common law, namely, the decision of suc-
cessive specific controversies as they arose, with a consequent ultimate establishment
of a line separating limitations deserving the label "convenient" from limitations
deserving the label "inconvenient." 4 RESTATEMENT, op. cit. supra note 28, at 2128.
The process by which remotely-vesting future interests were invalidated became recognizable
at the time of the Duke of Norfolk's Case in 1685. For a detailed history of the Rule Against
Perpetuites' development, see GRAY, op. cit. supra-note 29, §§ 123-71.
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interests which society has in stimulating the acquisition of wealth by
giving those who acquire it some measure of control over its disposition
must be balanced against the countervailing interests which society has
in keeping property responsive to the needs of its present owners.39
With the passage of time this initial test of "inconvenience" was sup-
planted by the more rigid and mechanical test of lives in being and
twenty-one years4" (though the same factors of compromise continued to
support the new perpetuities test), and finally, toward the end of the last
century, under the determined guidance of Professor Gray, the Rule
Against Perpetuities took its final form as a rule prohibiting remoteness
in vesting, as distinguished from a rule prohibiting undue suspension of
the power of alienation.4 Since that time it has been familiarly known
in all jurisdictions following the common law perpetuities system' by
Gray's classic shorthand statement: "No interest is good unless it must
vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being
at the time of the creation of the interest."43
39. See, e.g., MoRRis & LEACH, op. cit. supra note 31, ati7; SIMES, op. cit. supra note 36,
at 58; 4 RESTATEMENT, op. cit. supra note 28, at 2129-33.
40. The evolution of the "perpetuities period" is summarized in 4 RESTATEMENT, op. Cit.
supra note 28, at § 374, comment a, and examined in detail in GRAY, op, ct, supra note 29,
ch. 5.
41. The exact nature of the Rule Against Perpetuities was at one time the subject of con-
siderable controversy among the property law experts. The question argued was whether the
rule looks solely to remoteness in vesting or whether it looks as well to the undue suspension
of the absolute power to convey a fee simple. Those who favored the latter interpretation
argued that the rule holds no objection to unvested interests as such, but only to those which
might unduly suspend the power of alienation. Those who followed Gray in favoring a
remoteness of vesting interpretation were not much concerned with the suspension of the
power of alienation and argued that the rule invalidates all remotely vesting future interests,
regardless of their effect upon the power to convey a fee. These opposing views were fi-
nally reconciled by Dean Fraser in his celebrated article: The Rationale of the Rule Against
Perpetuities, 6 MINN. L REv. 560 (1922). Dean Fraser concluded that the Rule Against
Perpetuities is fundamentally and ultimately a rule which seeks to ensure the alienability of
property, and that therefore the operation of the rule must depend upon the practical effect
which any particular limitation may have upon the alienability of property. He found that
both views were substantially correct and that while the cases talked of the suspension of the
power of alienation the form of the rule was directed toward vesting. Fraser s one finding
which has significance for this discussion on trust duration was that, contrary to the orthodox
theories relied on by the "suspension" advocates, the rule may be violated even though there
are persons having the power through concerted action to convey a fee simple absolute in
property. This he attributed to the practical nature of the rule, which he said looks not so
much at the "theoretical possibility of a joint conveyance as at the practical improbability of
it." Fraser, supra at 573. This principle will be of importance in a later context of this
discussion. See discussion at pp. 379-83 infra.
42. As indicated in note 10 supra, a number of jurisdictions have statutory perpetuities
rules patterned after the early New York "suspension of alienation" perpetuities system. See
generally IA BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 9, § 219. Most jurisdictions, however, have retained
either by statute or judicial decision the common-law remoteness of vesting rule that reached its
final culmination with the publication of Gray s famous treatise on the rule.
43. GRAY, op. cit. supra note 29, § 201.
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The Social and Economic Functions Served by the
Rule Against Perpetuites
This thumbnail sketch of the Rule Against Perpetuities' evolution
has been included in the present discussion for three reasons: first, be-
cause it calls to mind the ancient common law policies favoring
the free circulation and maximum utilization of property which underlie
the problems of trust duration as well as trust indestructibility; second,
because it illustrates the eminently practical approach which has been
taken by the common law in meeting problems of property fettering;44
and third, because it illustrates the way in which the courts have com-
promised and subordinated the rights of individual property owners in
order to secure what they have regarded as the more important interests
and needs of society as a whole.
Turning to the last of these reasons, it might be said that the Rule
Against Perpetuities, and all of the other rules which have been designed
to limit property fettering, have only been concerned with balancing the
interests of respective classes of individuals - in the case of the Rule
Against Perpetuities, the interests that present and future owners may
have in a particular quantum of property - and that if the interests of
society have benefited in the bargain, that benefit has been only acci-
dental, not intentional. In a narrow sense this kind of observation has
some truth to it, for of course it is a fact that the Rule Against Per-
pettties has been used and will continue to be used as a means for
balancing the interests of individual members of society. Yet, looking
to the way m which the Rule Against Perpetuities was developed by the
courts, and to the social and economic functions which it is still said to
serve, it seems a distortion of history to say that the rule has not been
fundamentally concerned with protecting society's own interest in the
free circulation and maximum utilization of property. Consider, for
example, the social and economic functions which the authors of the
Restatement of Property45 have said are served by the rule: First, it has
Been said that the rule, by limiting the rights of present owners to curtail
the use of property by future owners "embodies one of the compromises
prerequisite to the maintenance of a going society controlled primarily by
its living members."4 This compromise is regarded as a social necessity
because "only by means of substantial restrictions upon the actions of
[both present and future owners can] . maximum liberty for all" be
achieved. Second, it has been said that the rule "contributes to the
44. See in this regard the remarks of Dean Fraser, quoted in note 41 supra. See also Metz,
supra note 9, at 159.
45. 4 RESTATEMENT, op. cit. supra note 28, at 2129-33.
46. Id. at 2129-30.
47. Id. at 2129.
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probable utilization of the wealth of society," as well as to the free cir-
culation of that wealth, both by prohibiting those kinds of future
interests which make sales of property either impossible or improbable,
and by eliminating a fear in present owners that their investments and
improvements will inure to the benefit of future takers. 8 Thzrd, it
has been said that the rule is necessary for the preservation of the
competitive basis of society, since "lintations unalterably effective
over a long period of time would hamper the normal operation of the
competitive struggle. Persons less keen in the social struggle might
be thereby enabled to retain property disproportionate to their skills in
the competitive struggle." 9  And, finally, it has been said that the rule
"aids in the keeping of property responsive to the meeting of the exi-
gencies of its current owners."5  This it accomplishes by restricting
those kinds of successive interests which tend "to lessen the sum realizable
upon a sale of the separated interests"'" and by limiting the time during
which a given quantum of wealth can be committed, as it may be com-
mitted under a trust, "to the satisfaction of specific and stated ends.""S
In these latter applications, as the Restatement significantly observes,
the rule is not being used to prevent "lessened freedom of alienation",
rather, in these applications "its function has broadened to include the
prevention of limitations which 'freeze' or 'tie-up' or 'fetter' property for
too long a time, even though no specific thing has been made inalienable,
even for a moment."53
Viewed against these great social purposes, it is the writer's opinion
that the public policies which support the Rule Against Perpetuities and
provide the essential framework for a discussion of trust duration and
indestructibility must be regarded as being primarily concerned with
society's interest in promoting the free circulation and maximum utiliza-
tion of property, and only secondarily concerned with unfettering the
interests of individual property owners as a means for achieving those
more fundamental ends. It is also the writer's opinion that, given this
view of the objectives of public policy, a rule of trust law which serves
only to unfetter the interests of individual beneficiaries and which fails
to meet the needs of society itself, is inadequate and unacceptable.
If one shares these opinions, it then becomes necessary to consider
whether there is anything in the nature of long-lasting private trusts
which may offend the interests which society itself has in the free circu-
48. Id. at 2130-31.
49. Id. at 2132.
50. Id. at 2131.
51. Ibui.
52. Id. at 2132.
53. Ibul.
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lation and maximum utilization of property, and which cannot in all cases
be remedied by giving trust beneficiaries the power of termination after
the perpetuities period has run its course. This is really the most critical
aspect of the whole duration and indestructibility problem, for. on it the
case for a rule strictly limiting trust duration must either stand or fall.
The Economic Justification for a Rule Limiting Trust Duration
In considering the economic reasons which might justify a rule limit-
ing the- duration of private trusts, it should be mentioned at the outset
that there is a marked divergence of opinion among the property law ex-
perts as to whether the use of the trust device can ever defeat the public
policies favoring the free circulation and maximum utilization of property
where the property held in trust is, as it usually is today, corporate securi-
ties or. government bonds. Professor Simes has taken the position in
arguing that the Rule Against Perpetutles may in some respects be out-
moded that the restraints imposed by a trust are wholly illusory where
corporate securities are involved:
The subject matter of [a] trust is commonly corporate shares and
government or corporate bonds. In the case of corporate shares, the
economic value is neither in the interest owned by the beneficiaries of
the trust, nor is it in the shares in the hands of the trustee. It is the
property of the corporation. Certainly that is freely alienable. Indeed,
the corporate directors are under a duty to make a profit for the stock-
holders, if they are able to do so, which is but another way of saying
that they must make the property of the corporation productive. 5
The same view has been taken, somewhat more equivocally, by the Re-
statement of Property:
The contribution of the rule against perpetuites to the probable
utilization of the wealth of society is greatest when the subject matter
is specific land or some tangible thing. As to intangibles this socially
desirable consequence of the rule is not so dear, since shares and bonds
constitute an important bulk of intangibles, and, as to intangibles of
these types, restrictions operative as to the shares or bonds would in no
way hamper the utilization of its assets by the issuing corporation. 55
On the other hand, it has been argued that even where corporate
securities are the subject of a trust, and even where the trustee is given
the power of sale and substitution, the policies of the law may be de-
feated because the quantum of wealth represented by those securities is
reduced by virtue of the separation of the legal and equitable titles. Thus,
in justifying its rule limiting the tine during which a private trust may
be rendered indestructible, the Restatement says:
54. SIMES, op. cit. supra note 36, at 42-43.
55. 4 RESTATEMENT, op. cit. supra note 28, at 2130-31.
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The creation of a trust unavoidably fetters the subject matter of the
limitation. Even when the trustee has an unqualified power to dis-
pose of the assets constituting the trust corpus and to reinvest the funds
so obtained , the fact remains that the continuance of the trust, as
to the substituted assets, fetters the quantum of wealth subjected to the
trust. If the interest of the beneficiary of such a trust is alienable, this
enables the beneficiary merely to impair the efficacy of the trust as a
provision for his needs. The assured continuance of the trust also makes
it difficult for such a beneficiary to derive benefit from an exercise of
his power of alienation, as few purchasers for such interests are avail-
able. Thus the creation of a trust fetters the subject matter of the lim-
itation and this is a potentially inconvenient fettering, in the sense that
public policy requires that it be kept within limits.56
And in its apology for the Rule Against Perpetuities' application to in-
terests created in trust, the Restatement goes on to say that
when assets are transferred to a trustee who is given unqualified power
to change the form of the trust res, no inalienability of any specific tan-
gible thing can be said to be caused by the limitation of future interests
under or after the trust. Nevertheless, it is well established law that
the rule against perpetuities applies not only to limitations made con-
cerning intangibles, such as bonds and shares, but also to limitations of
the beneficial interests under a trust where the trustee has unqualified
power to change the trust res. Both of these situations have one com-
mon factor, namely, that a given quantum of wealth is sought to be
committed to the satisfaction of specific and stated ends. Such a com-
mitment, for its duration, lessens the availability of these assets for the
meeting of current newly arising exigencies. Law which is animated
by the idea that the world and its wealth exist for the living cannot tol-
erate too long a commitment of this sort. Thus the rule against per-
petuities, by regulating the future interests which can be created in these
two situations, assists in keeping property reasonably free to answer the
exigencies, as they arise, of the possessor and of his family. In these
applications of the rule, it no longer is preventing lessened freedom of
alienation. Its function has broadened to include the prevention of lim-
itations which 'freeze' or 'tie up' or 'fetter' property for too long a time,
even though no specific thing has been made inalienable, even for a
moment.
57
While the writer would agree with these latter statements that the
policies favoring the free circulation and maximum utilization of prop-
erty can be hampered by use of the trust device, even in those cases
where the trust assets are composed of corporate securities or govern-
ment bonds, it must nevertheless be recognized that the reasons advanced
in support of the quoted statements lend nothing of significance to the
debate over whether there should be a rule against prolonged trust
duration, as distinguished from a rule against prolonged trust indestructi-
bility. When, for example, the Restatement says that the use of the
trust device fetters the property interests of the beneficiary because the
56. Id. at § 381, comment a.
57 Id. at 2131-32.
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separation of the legal and equitable tides makes it more difficult for
the beneficiary to dispose of his interest at a fair price, the emphasis is
being placed squarely on the trust device's effect on the beneficiary's
personal interest. Yet, as has already been demonstrated," the bene-
ficiary himself has no reason to complain of prolonged trust duration
as long as he is given the power to terminate his trust and merge the legal
and equitable tides to his property. If he allows the trust to run its course
despite his power to compel termination, he has only himself to blame
for any continued fettering of his interests. This fact makes it plain that
if any justification is to be found for a rule limiting the duration of a
trust settled in corporate securities, that justification cannot be found in
the effects which use of the trust device may have upon the beneficiaries'
interests; it must instead be found, if at all, in the effects which such a
trust may have upon the interests which society itself has in the free cir-
culation and maximum utilization of property.
The Investment Conservatism of Corporate Trustees
In the writer's opinion, a justification for such a rule in terms of
society's interests does in fact exist, and in a word can be traced to the
conservative investment control which corporate trustees exercise over
the enormous assets which are held today in private trusts. Although
this is a subject which has received only scant attention from econo-
mists and only passing comment from legal writers,5" it is nonethe-
less no secret that with the increasing industrialization of our society and
the increasing polarization of wealth in corporate securities, the trust de-
vice has become an ever more popular means of disposing of private for-
tunes, both large and small. Corporate trustees, aided by tax laws which
encourage the settlement of long-lasting trusts and by the complexities
involved in administering wealth in today's society, have become the man-
agers of vast wealth, much of it represented by corporate securities.' Yet,
58. See discussion at p. 356 supra.
59. Of all the legal literature on the subjects of trust duration and indestructibility, the
writer has discovered only one article which discusses in any detail the serious economic con-
sequences which may result from the centralization of vast wealth in long-lasting trusts. In
this one article, Comment, 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 92 (1952), the student author collects such
economic data and statistics as are available on the subject of conservative trustee control over
great wealth and concludes from these data and statstics that use of the trust device must be
drastically limited if a viable and progressive economy is to be maintained. Indeed, the
author goes so far as to suggest that in order to curtail the "adverse economic effects of a
trusteeship," legislation should be introduced to limit the use of private trusts for the benefit
of only three classes of beneficiaries: the elderly, the young, and the incompetent. Id. at 102.
60. The present gift and estate tax structure, by taxing multiple-generation gifts only once,
provides a strong financial incentive to the creation of long-lasting trusts. The importance
of this factor may be appreciated from the following example:
If A left $5,000,000 to B, who left it to C, who left it to D, who left it to E,
assuming that there were no marital deductions involved and that the property
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at the same tme, it is also no secret that, while the assets under the in-
vestment control of these trustees have increased by geometric leaps and
bounds, the inhibitions (practical if not legal) against their investment
of even a small fraction of those assets in truly speculative ventures
have in no way diminished. Nor are they likely ever to diminish, even
with the continued liberalization of the rules regulating the investment
powers of trustees, since gambling with trust assets and the welfare of
trust beneficiaries has always been, and is likely to always remain, contrary
to the corporate trustee's role as protector and preserver of property.6
The inevitable result of all of this is the drying up of the available
sources of risk capital. As more and more assets are funneled into pri-
remained unchanged in value, four estate taxes would be imposed. E would finally
inherit $718,721 or less than 15 percent of the original estate. If, on the other
hand, B, C, and D had been given successive life estates with a final remainder
to E, there would have been only one tax and E would inherit $2,569,600, or over
50 percent of the original estate. Lowndes, Introduction to Tax Planning for Estates,
27 N.C.L REV. 2, 10 (1948)
Although statistics on the amount of wealth held in private trusts are extremely hard to
come by, the author of the article cited at note 59 supra, refers to one study which estimated
that the total amount of assets held in private trust in 1939 was 50 billion dollars. See
TNEC, SA ViNGS AND INvErmNT 3729 (1939), cited in Comment, 18 U. CIi. L. REV. 92,
99, n.28 (1952). The writer has searched without success for a more up-to-date estimate
of the amount of assets that are subject to the conservative investment control of trustees;
however, any such estimate would necessarily exceed by many billions the 50-billion dollar
estimate given for the depression year of 1939.
61. Even with the very considerable liberalization of trustee investment powers in recent
decades - a liberalization which has eliminated virtually all of the archaic and unreasonable
restrictions on trustees - such statistics as are available on the subject bear out the truism
that trustees do not and will not invest in speculative securities. Where they have the legal
power to invest in common stocks, all available evidence indicates that the pattern of their
investments gravitates inevitably toward the recognized "blue chips" where risk of loss is at
a minimum. See Comment, 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 92, 100, n.33 (1952); see also Riddle,
Trust Investments: Their Extent and Some Related Problems, 5 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
339, 353 (1938). This practice conforms to the advice given by the professional invest-
ment advisers, who routinely exhort trustees to purchase common stocks of the highest quality-
"[A] well established business, financial strength, demonstrated earning capacity, a good
record of dividend payments, capable management, and some prospects for growth and im-
provement in position are almost prerequisite for a healthy equity investment." Chap-
man, Investing Trust Funds under The Prudent-Man Rule, 23 TRuST BULL. 2, 7 (April
1944).
Writing on this essential and inevitable investment conservatism of trustees, the author
of the law review comment referred to at note 59 supra, states:
Despite these trends [toward liberalized investment powers] the proportion of
total trust assets invested in speculative securities is still low. It appears evident
from the nature of the trust relationship that this will continue to be the case, for
even where these reforms have been adopted it is still a fundamental rule of trustee-
ship that a fiduciary's primary concern is the safety of the trust principal. Fear of
surcharge causes him to act with extreme caution at all times. Investment at too
high a rate of return may indicate that he has been speculating, a practice which
is universally condemned. See, e.g., Headley, A Trustee in a World of Changing
Values, 5 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 355, 365 (1938) Therefore, despite attempts
to abolish restraints on the type of securities a trustee may purchase, it is highly im-
probable that risk capital will be furnished to any great extent by trustees in the
future. The equities that they buy will continue to be those of large established
enterprises with long records of regular dividend payments. Comment, 18 U. CHI.
L. Riv., 92, 100 (1952).
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vate trusts administered by corporate trustees operating under an essen-
tially conservative investment code, less and less capital is made available
for those new and unproved ventures which, if the economists are to be
believed, are the sine qua non of a progressive and "going" society.
Small and fledgling enterprises, lacking the internal resources which
large corporations can usually tap for expansion and development,62
are increasingly at pains to find adequate external sources of risk capital."
The consequences of this struggle are a further aggrandizement of "big
business" and a further throttling of speculative enterprises - conse-
quences which most economists and social observers would agree are det-
rimental to our economic and social system. 4
But even if the existence of this risk capital problem is acknowledged,
it might be wondered how a problem of such magnitude could be reme-
died by any single rule of trust law, let alone a rule which would merely
limit the duration of a trust to the very considerable period of lives in be-
ing and twenty-one years? 65 The answer to this question, of course, is
that a rule against prolonged duration would not entirely remedy the
problem, and in the nature of things would probably be limited to a very
minor role in any coordinated effort to meet the problem head on.6" But
62. See Comment, 18 U. CI. L. REV. 92, 98 nn.23-25 (1952), and accompanying text.
63. Numerous studies have been made and reports issued on the financing problems of
small business. Representative of these are the following: BROWN UNlVERsrrY, THE EFFECT
OF TIGHT MONEY ON SMALL BusINESS FINANCiNG 119-121 (1963); FEDERAL RESERVE
SYSTEM, FINANCING SMALL BuSINESS 13, 117, 122 (1958); SMITH, EQUITY AND LOAN
CAPITAL FOR NEW AND EXPANDING SMALL BuSINESS 29-30 (1959); WBISSMAN, SMALL
BuSINESS AND VENTURE CAPITAL ch. 3 (1945); U.S. SENATE, SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO
STUDY PROBLEMS OF AMERICAN SMALL BuSINESS, FUTURE OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS
(1947) [hereinafter cited as U.S. SENATE REPORT]. The latter report concludes as follows:
One of the most serious handicaps confronting small business as it seeks to establish
itself firmly and expand as rapidly as possible to insure success and survival in
this competitive society is lack of capital. When small business seeks capital,
either as loans for current operations or for equity financing, it is faced with ob-
stacles not encountered by its bigger business rivals. It must usually put up propor-
tionately more security, submit to stiffer business terms, and pay relatively higher
interest rates. It consequently starts off in the competitive race with serious handi-
caps which do not necessarily reflect relative business ability or chances of success
under competitive conditions. Such handicaps may well account for failure of many
businesses to survive the initial stages of development. Tbd.
64. See, e.g., PROXMiEE, CAN SMALL BuSINESS SURViVE? 26 (1964); U.S. SENATE RE-
PORT, op. cit. supra note 63, at 26; WEISSMAN, op. cit. supra note 63, at ch. 1.
65. As is pointed out at p. 371 mfra, there is no magic in lives in being and twenty-one
years as a period for limiting trust duration. Viewed from an economic standpoint, the
period is no doubt an excessive one, and, were it not for the period's solid entrenchment in
the law, the adoption of a much shorter measuring period could easily be justified.
66. Because of the gravity of the financing problems facing small business, the federal
government has in the past several decades launched a broad campaign to assist small business
in obtaining the necessary capital for development and expansion. See, e.g., FEDERAL RE-
sERvE SYSTm op. cit. supra note 63, at 117; U.S. SENATE REPORT, op. cit. supra note 63, at
ch. 3. In addition, private groups and institutions have made an all-out effort to sort out the
causes for the financing problems of small business, and to propose remedies other than direct
government support. See, e.g., BROWN UNIVERSITY, op. ctt. supra note 63, at 119-121. SMITH,
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the fact that such a rule would not function as a universal remedy should
not deter the courts from giving it careful consideration. Even if a rule
limiting duration released to individual control only a small fraction of
the total assets held in trust at any given time, that in itself would be of
some benefit and would necessarily increase, in some small degree at least,
the likelihood of small businesses' finding the risk capital needed to pro-
mote speculative ventures. On the other hand, if no action were taken
on the duration issue, the problems posed by long-term trustee investment
control could only stand to worsen, with a consequent emasculation of
the social policies favoring the free circulation and maximum utilization
of wealth.
The conclusion which is to be drawn from this discussion on the ob-
jectives of social policy6" and on the economic problems created by con-
servative trustee investment control over enormous resources is that a rule
limiting the duration of private trusts can be legally and socially justi-
fied. Such a rule would serve to protect not only the interests of indi-
vidual trust beneficiaries (except in those cases where the beneficiaries
themselves want their interests to remain in trust after the perpetuities
period has elapsed6 ), but also the interests which society has in promoting
the free circulation and maximum utilization of wealth. As an instrument
of social policy, such a rule would serve much the same ends that the Rule
Against Perpetuities has served for centuries, and could be explained and
justified in much the same terms which the Restatement of Property has
used in justifying the continued use of the latter rule:
In another quite different way the rule against perpetuities serves
to keep property responsive to the needs of its current owners. When
wealth takes the form of bonds or shares issued by a corporation, the
assets represented by such bonds or shares are at least potentially pro-
ductive in the business of the issuing corporation, regardless of how
inalienable the bonds or shares may be in the hands of their owners.
Similarly, when assets are transferred to a trustee who is given unquali-
fied power to change the form of the trust res, no inalienability of any
specific tangible thing can be said to be caused by the limitation of
future interests under or after the trust. Nevertheless, it is well estab-
lished law that the rule against perpetuities applies not only to limita-
op. cit. supra note 63, at 29-30. Obviously, in the wake of all this discussion and broadscale
activity, the problems imposed by excessive trust duration shrink in relative importance.
67 On the role of social policy in judicial rule making, Mr. Justice Holmes has said:
The very considerations which judges most rarely mention, and always with an
apology, are the secret root from which the law draws all the juices of life. I mean,
of course, considerations of what is expedient for the community concerned. Every
important principle which is developed by litigation is in fact and at bottom the
result of more or less definitely understood views of public policy; most generally,
to be sure, under our practice and traditions, the unconscious result of instinctive
preferences and inarticulate convictions, but none the less traceable to views of public
policy in the last analysis. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 35 (1881)
68. It is in just such cases that the need for a duration rule is most urgent. See discussion
pp. 369-70 and note 71 infra.
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tions made concerning intangibles, such as bonds and shares, but also to
limitations of the beneficial interests under a trust where the trustee has
unqualified power to change the trust res. Both of these situations have
one common factor, namely, that a given quantum of wealth is sought
to be committed to the satisfaction of specific and stated ends. Such a
commitment, for its duration, lessens the availability of these assets for
the meeting of current newly arisng exigencies. Law which is animated
by the idea that the world and its wealth exist for the living cannot toler-
ate too long a commitment of this sort.69
The Problem of External versus Internal AttacA
If one admits to the need for a rule against prolonged duration and-
finds legal justification for it in the same public policies which continue
to support the Rule Against Perpetuities, the next question which must
be considered is how such a rule should operate on long-lasting trusts.
Should it invalidate such trusts ab snitto, thereby subjecting them to im-
mediate "external" attack by those persons who would stand to take if the
trusts were held void; or should it permit long-lasting trusts to continue
during the permissible period, whatever that might be, and then subject
them to "internal" attack by those persons who would be entitled to take
the proceeds upon termination?7" At first blush, the second of these
alternatives seems by far the more reasonable one, for it would accomplish
in large measure the objectives of the settlor. However, on closer exami-
nation, when it is seen that subjecting a trustto internal attack after the
permissible period has elapsed is no different than giving the beneficiaries
a power of termination under a rule against prolonged indestructibility,
it becomes evident that a duration rule operating in such a fashion would
achieve nothing. It is in just those situations where the trust beneficiaries
have the power to terminate but choose not to exercise that power for rea-
sons deemed satisfactory to themselves, that society's need for a rule strictly
limiting duration is most apparent. In fact, it is because society's inter-
ests in the free circulation and maximum utilization of property are too
important to be left in the hands of individual beneficiaries for their en-
69. 4 RESTATEmENT, op. cit. supra note 28, at 2131-32. (Emphasis added.)
70. Cleary was the first to employ the phrases "external" attack and "internal" attack in
the context of trust duration and indestructibility. Cleary, Indestructible Testamentary Trusts,
43 YAL L.J. 393 (1934) Cleary defines the terms in this way-
Efforts to terminate trusts prior to the time indicated in the trust instrument fall
into two classes: "external" attack and "internal" attack. By "external"- attack the
writer means an effort to destroy-the trust in its entirety, i.e., to obtain a judgment
holding void the interests of both trustee and beneficiaries. Such an attack is com-
monly made by the intestate successors or residuary devisees or legatees of the trus-
tor, whose interests are opposed to those of the beneficiaries of the trust. By "in-
ternal" attack is meant an effort by the beneficiaries themselves to eliminate the
trustees interest while maintaining their own beneficial interests and enlarging
them into full possession and control of-the trust property. Id. at 397.
The Restatement also employs the terms in its discussion of indestructibility. See 4 RESrATE-
MENT, op. cit. supra note 28, § 381, comment a.
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forcement that a rule against prolonged duration is requred.7' If so-
ciety's interests and objectives could be satisfied by giving individual bene-
ficiaries the power of termination, all that would be necessary to protect
both classes of interests would be a rule limiting the time during which
private trusts could be made indestructible. It follows, therefore, that
any rule limiting trust duration must, to be effective, invalidate at the
outset any trust having a capacity for excessive duration. Such a rule,
while it might operate harshly on the objectives of the settlor, would at
least accomplish its stated social objectives, and would in addition serve
as a deterrent to the creation of long-lasting trusts." Furthermore, a rule
couched in such terms would fit the pattern which has already been set in
cases dealing with the duration of "honorary" trusts and trusts for unin-
corporated associations.73
The Period of the Duration Rule
The other question which must be considered in formulating a rule
against prolonged duration is the period which the rule should take. If
one wanted to be doctrinaire on the subject, it could be argued that any
use of the trust device, for however short a period, hampers society's in-
terest in the circulation and utilization of property, since the quantum of
wealth placed in a trust is subjected, even for only a limited time, to the
conservative investment control of the trustee. But obviously such an
argument could not be given serious consideration since private trusts
serve so many useful purposes that their total abolishment would be un-
thinkable.74 What is needed, therefore, in adopting a permissible period
for a rule on trust duration is the same spirit of compromise that was
shown by the courts in fashioning a rule against remotely-vesting future
interests,75 a spirit of compromise which gives recogmtion to society's in-
71. If it were a demonstrable axiom of human behavior that trust beneficiaries always want
to unfetter their own property interests at the earliest possible moment, there would be no
need to trouble with the problem of excessive trust duration. Under such circumstances,
giving beneficiaries the right to destroy the trusts in which their interests were held would
accomplish society's objectives at the same time that it accomplished the personal objectives
of the beneficiaries. Unfortunately, however, experience has shown that many trust bene-
fictaries are quite content to have their interests remain safely in trust (where annoying
details of management and administration are handled by a paid trustee), and have not the
slightest interest in vindicating any social or economic policies by compelling the termination
of their trusts after the perpetuites period has elapsed.
72. Compare the remarks quoted in the text at note 126 infra.
73. See generally IA BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 9, §§ 415-18; 1 Scor, op. cit. supra note
9, § 62.10 (e) and cases cited therein; see also authorities cited in notes 98, 100 Mifra.
74. Interestingly, one writer has suggested that all private trusts, except those settled for
the benefit of the elderly, minors, and incompetents, should be abolished because of the in-
jurious effects which trusts have upon the flow of capital in our economy. See Comment,
18 U. Cii1. L. REV. 92, 102 (1952) The author recognized that there was little hope that this
suggestion would be followed by the legislatures.
75. See discussion pp. 359-60 sapra.
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terest in preserving the trust device as a means for disposing of private
wealth as well as to society's interest in limiting the use of that device
for the sake of promoting the free circulation and maximum utilization
of property.
If it were not for the incrustations of history, it would be feasible and
perhaps desirable to adopt as a measuring period for trust duration some
other, and preferably shorter, period than lives in being and twenty-one
years. But in view of that period's long-standing service in the rules re-
lating to illegal "perpetuties," it would be unrealistic to think that the
courts would accept any other measuring period in fashioning a rule
against the prolonged duration of private trusts. So much of history and
judicial thinking is tied to the period of lives in being and twenty-one
years, and so many of the judicial dicta and text statements on trust duration
have assumed that that period regulates the permissible duration of trusts, 
7
that little hope could be harbored for adoption of some other, shorter
period (except of course by means of legislation) It follows, therefore,
that if any sympathy exists for a rule on trust duration - and the many
dicta on the subject indicate that such sympathy does exist- that sym-
pathy will find expression in the adoption of a rule that takes the perpetu-
ities period of lives in being and twenty-one years as its measuring period.
Here again, such a result would conform to the pattern which has already
been established in the judicial invalidation of long-lasting "honorary"
trusts and trust for unincorporated associations."7
Conclusins on the Duration Issue
From the foregoing discussion on the problem of trust duration, it is
plain that this writer regards the adoption of a rule against prolonged
duration as a social and economic necessity and feels that legal justification
for such a rule can be found in the common law policies which continue
to support and justify the Rule Against Perpetuities. But this, it must be
emphasized, is a conviction which most of the modern writers have
not shared. It is also a conviction on what the law should be and not on
what the law actually is today. As has already been pointed out, those
older authorities which once took the view that long-lasting private trusts
should be invalidated as illegal perpetuities have since been disapproved
or repudiated 8 and in their place have arisen authorities which take the
view that prolonged indestructibility and not prolonged duration is what
the law must regulate. It is to these latter authorities that the discussion
of the second section of this article will be directed.
76. See, e.g., the cases and authorities cited at notes 1, 3, 5, 7 supra.
77. See authorities cited at note 73 supra.
78. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
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II.
THE PROBLEM OF TRUST INDESTRUCTIBILITY
The English and Amercan Rules on Trust Termnation
Once the view has been taken, as it has been taken by the modem
property and trust law experts, 9 that trust duration is an irrelevancy and
that trust indestructibility is the "evil" which the law must reckon with,
the rules of trust law relating to termination by beneficiaries must be
examined. In pursuing this topic, the same hypothetical trust limitation
used in the previous discussion may be posed, wzz., a testamentary trust in
favor of A, a bachelor, for life, then in favor of A's first born son in fee,
with instructions to the trustee to withhold principal from the son until
he is forty-five, income to be paid him in the meantime. In such a situa-
tion, is the provision for postponement controlling upon the beneficiary
or may he, after he becomes su jurzs, compel the termination of the trust
and take his interest free of the restriction?
In England it was established at an early date that a postponement of
enjoyment is not controlling on a beneficiary, and that once he is of legal
age he may compel the trustee to convey the property to him free of
any restrictions. This was the result reached in the leading case of Saun-
ders v Vautzer,s° in which the testator had bequeathed all of his stock in
the East India Company to his trustees with the instruction to convey the
stock to a certain nephew when he reached the age of twenty-five. The
nephew, upon reaching twenty-one, petitioned the Master of the Rolls to
order a transfer of the stock to him. This petition was ultimately granted
by the Lord Chancellor who said little more than that he was "clearly of
the opinion" that the nephew was entitled to the stock, despite the con-
trary instructions of the testator."s Later English cases have adhered to
this rule but have made no attempt to elaborate on the reasons behind it.
Usually they have said only that a postponement of enjoyment is "repug-
nant to the gift.
8 2
79. See discussion pp. 353-56 supra.
80. 4 Beav. 115, 41 Eng. Rep. 482 (1841)
81. Id. at 117, 41 Eng. Rep. at 485. The principal question of the case was whether the
gift was vested or contingent. After holding the gift to be vested, the Lord Chancellor then
ruled that the son should have an immediate right to the corpus. No authority was cited
for the latter holding, a fact which prompted Lord Hershel to comment in Wharton v. Mas-
terman, [1895] A.C. 186, 193, that "the point seems, in the first instance, to have been
rather assumed than decided."
82. The later authorities are collected in GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 5 120
n.2 (4th ed. 1942); KALES, ESTATES, FUTURE INTERESTS AND ILLEGAL CONDITIONS AND
RESTRAINTS IN ILLINOIS § 734 (1920). Kales gave a well-reasoned discussion of the
English doctrine and cases. He differed with Gray in saying that there was no substantial foun-
dation in policy for the rule of Saunders v. Vautmr.
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In the United States the opposite rule obtains in a great majority of
jurisdictions. This rule owes its existence and name to the famous case
of Claflin v. Claflin,5 decided by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts in 1889. The trust in Claflin provided that a gift of personal
property wich had been made to the testator's son should be, paid out by
the trustees in the following manner: $10,000 when the son reached the
age of twenty-one, $10,000 when he reached twenty-five, and the balance
when he reached thirty. After the son had come of age, he asked, on the
basis of the holding in the Saunders case, that the whole fund be immedi-
ately paid to him. This petition was denied. After distinguishing earlier
Massachusetts cases in winch the Saunders rule had apparently been fol-
lowed, 4 the court found that the postponement of enjoyment violated
neither public policy nor the nature of the gift. Observing that the "re-
striction upon the plaintiff's possession and control [was] . one that
the testator had a right to make," the court said that it could find "no
good reason why the intention of the testator should not be carried out."85
The Claflin decision experienced an uneven reception. On the one
hand, it was greeted with favor by a great majority of the courts6 (who,
after welcoming the spendthrift trust doctrine, could not easily turn away
the holding in Claflin8 ). On the other hand, it was met with chilly dis-
approval by Gray and some of the other writers 8 who had been waging
a losing battle against spendthrift trusts. The eloquent and impassioned
plea wich Professor Gray had earlier made for abolition of spendthrift
trusts8 9 set the tone for his handling of the Claflin decision. He argued
83. 149 Mass. 19, 20 N.E. 454 (1889).
84. In Sears v. Choate, 146 Mass. 395, 398, 15 N.E. 786, 790 (1888), the court had re-
iterated the usual formulation of the Saunders v. Vautser rule. In the Sears case the court
could find no good reason for denying termination; in Claffin the court could find no good
reason for granting it.
85. Claflin v. Claflin, 149 Mass. 19, 24, 20 N.E. 454, 456 (1889) Although the Massa-
chusetts court did not decide whether such a postponement would be binding upon a creditor
or other party to whom the beneficiary had transferred his interest in the trust, it has since
been held that the transferee will be so bound. See, e.g., Ster v. Nashville Trust Co., 158 Fed.
601 (6th Cir. 1908); see also IRETATEm3NT (SECOND), TRUSTs § 337, comment k .(1959).
Any other treatment would render the postponement an empty recitation.
86. The Ca14in doctrine is now firmly established in almost every jurisdiction. 4 (pt. 2)
BOGERT, TRusTs & TRuSTmES § 1002 (2d ed. 1948); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS
§ 337(2) (1959).
87. It is unlikely that the courts gave much thought to the indirect, practical restraints which
Claflin might impose upon the free circulation of property where it would result in a trust's
enduring beyond the period of lives in being and twenty-one years.
88. Professor Scott was one of those writers who deplored both spendthrift trusts and
postponements of enjoyment. He remarked that "the purpose of a spendthrift trust is the
coddling of a person against himself and as against third persons. The purpose of the post-
ponement of enjoyment as simply the coddling of a person as against himself." Scott, Control
of Property by the Dead, Part II, 65 U. PA. L RtEv. 632, 648 (1917).
89. See GRAY, RE TRAINTS ON THE ALIENATiON OF PROPERTY Preface (2d ed. 1895)
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that this decision had
introduced a novel idea into the law, that of the %nalienability of abso-
lute interests, just as the Court of King's Bench in Pells v. Brown in-
troduced a novel idea into the law, that of the indestructibility of future
interests. And as the Rule against Perpetuities had to be invented to
control the indestructible future interests created by Pells v. Brown, so
some rule must be invented to control the inalienable interests created
by Claflin v. Claflin.90
Gray's use of the word "inalienability" to describe the effects of a
clause postponing enjoyment is a curious one. In the Claflin case, there
had been no restraint on the alienation of the beneficial interest, at least
none in the usual sense. Therefore, postponements of enjoyment and the
Claflin rule which enforces them have not ordinarily been thought to
impose, in their own right, any direct restraint on the alienation of a
beneficial interest. But Gray disputed this, claiming that since a post-
ponement of enjoyment "restrains the owner of the absolute property
from exercising the right, he would otherwise possess, of transferring the
immediate right to the enjoyment [it may] be properly called a
restraint on alienation."'" Apart from this question, however, most of the
writers have agreed with Gray that some restriction must be imposed upon
the operation of the Claflin doctrine.92 Professor Kales was clearly of that
opinion, though he differed with Gray by saying that there was nothing
inherently objectionable in the Claflin decision. After delivering a
long and well-reasoned apology for the decision,9 3 he concluded by warn-
ing that
the allowance of postponements calculated to make trusts indestructible
forever, or for a great length of time, is not to be sustained under any
consideration. Nothing ought to be more certain than that the post-
poned enjoyment clause, valid under the doctrine of Claflin v. Claflin
must be subject [to time limitations]. It is, therefore, wholly void
if it may possibly continue longer than a life in being and twenty-one
years.94
Yet, despite this agreement among the writers that there must be some
regulation of the indestructibility of private trusts, there has been very
little agreement among the writers on the exact form which any rule
90. GRAY, op. cit. supra note 82, § 121.7
91. Id. at § 120 n.1. While there is some technical merit in this observation, it does not
seem to have accounted for much so far as the courts or other writers have been concerned.
Since direct restraints on alienation of an equitable interest are allowed under the spendthrift
trust doctrine, there is no special importance in this added element of restraint.
92. See, e.g., 1 ScOTT, TRUSTS § 62.10 (2d ed. 1956); Cleary, Indestructible Testamentary
Trusts, 43 YALE IJ. 393 (1934); Metz, Comment on the Application of the Rule Against
Perpetuittes to the Duraton of Private Trusts in Pennsylvanmi, 4 U. PiTT. L REv. 159 (1938);
Morray, The Rule Against Prolonged Indestructibility of Private Trusts, 44 ILL. L R.Ev. 467
(1949).
93. KALES, op. cit. supra note 82, § 732-38.
94. Id. § 737
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against prolonged indestructibility should take. Certain important fea-
tures of the proposed rule have not as yet been settled, and involve a con-
sideration of many of the same difficult policy questions which have al-
ready been considered in connection with the problem of excessive trust
duration.
The Rule Against Prolonged Indestructibility
The Permissible Period
A private trust which has been created in a Claflin jurisdiction and
which carries a provision postponing enjoyment, or in some other way
restraining termination, is according to present terminology an "inde-
structible" or "Claflin" trust. Therefore, the problem of indestructibility
can be simply stated in these terms: if a trust is rendered indestructible
by virtue of the Claflin doctrine, how long can public policy suffer that
indestructibility to continue in effect? At the time of Gray's initial com-
ments on the problem, there was little specific authority indicating what
limitations of time would be put on indestructibility. Gray thought it
likely that the period used by the Rule Against Perpetuities would be
adopted by the courts, but said that "it would seem quite open to the
courts to adopt some other period, if found more convenient."95 Al-
though this comment was no doubt intended to underscore his position
that the Rule Against Perpetuities itself had nothing to do with the prob-
lem of indestructibility, he realized at the same time that there would be
little chance of the courts' adopting some other measuring period." As it
has happened, Gray's predictions have been borne out: it is now quite
dearly settled that any rule which limits the indestructibility of private
trusts takes the period of lives in being and twenty-one years as its measur-
ing period." Authority for this position has been found, by analogy, in
the English cases holding restraints on alienation of a married woman's
estate invalid if designed to endure beyond the perpetuities period,9" and
95. GRAY, op. cit. supra note 82, § 121.7. The use of the perpetuities period was advocated
at an early date in Clark, Unenforceable Trusts and the Rule Against Perpetutes, 10 Mii
L. REV. 31, 37-38 (1911).
96. In some early cases it was said that indestructibility could not be prolonged for an "un-
reasonable" period, with no definite limits set on the term "unreasonable." See, e.g., DeLadson
v. Crawford, 93 Conn. 402, 106 At. 326 (1919) (dictum); Armstrong v. Barber, 239 Ill.
389, 88 N.E. 246 (1909).
97. See authorities cited in discussion at pp. 384-89 snfra;, note 92 supra. In considering the
period which would be used in any rule against prolonged indestructibility, it should be noted
that it has been held that if there is a rule limiting the duration of trusts, the period during
which the settlor has the power to revoke and destroy the trust is not counted in determining
the validity of the trust. Cook v. Horn, 214 Ga. 289, 104 S.E.2d 461 (1958).
98. These cases are discussed in GRAY, op. ct. supra note 89, §§ 272a-f. The most frequently
cited case is In re Ridley, 11 Ch. D. 645 (1879).
19651
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW[
also in the American and English cases dealing with honorary trusts99 and
trusts for accumulations.'
When the Period Begins to Run
A far more perplexing problem has been that concerning the point
of tne from which the perpetuities period should begin to run. This
problem is a particularly interesting one, for it places in high relief the
confusing and often contradictory theories which underlie the modern
analysis of the related problems of duration and indestructibility.
Strangely enough, it was Gray, the staunchest opponent of all re-
straints on alienation and property fettering, who took a position on this
question which can lead to the greatest interference with the policies fa-
voring free circulation. It will be recalled that Gray considered the evil
consequences of Claffin as flowing from the restraints on alienation and
postponed enjoyment which that doctrine holds for the beneficiaries. He
mentioned nothing of the effect which that doctrine might have upon ex-
cessive duration.'' It was natural, therefore, for Gray to consider the
validity of a provision for postponed enjoyment in light of the particular
trust interest to which that provision attached. He reasoned that any
successive interest in trust could be subjected to the same postponements
and restraints as a present interest, so long as that later interest vested
within the required period. "The true doctrine," he wrote, is that "a fu-
ture estate, not in itself too remote, can be subjected to the same restraints
to which a present estate can be subjected."'0 2  Accordingly, he quite
strongly urged that any period adopted to limit the indestructibility of a
trust should be measured from the time when the particular interest be-
gan to run.0 3 Thus, in a trust for the benefit of A, a bachelor, for
99. It is quite well settled that "honorary" trusts, i.e., trusts having no named beneficiaries,
will not be valid unless they are confined in duration to the perpetmries period. See for a
discussion of the duration issue which these "trusts" raise, MORRIS & LEACH, THE RULE
AGAINST PERPETurriEs 311-16 (1956); note 73 supra.
100. A direction to accumulate which might take effect for a longer period than lives in
being and twenty-one years is invalid, as a general rule. See GRAY, op. cit. supra note 82, ch.
20 and cases cited therein.
101. Id. ch. 4.
102. Id. § 437.2. To this contention it has been said: "It is not easy to see any answer to
this argument." Sweet, The Monstrous Regiment of the Rule Against Perpetulties, 18 JuRn.
REv. 132, 143 (1906)
Dean Griswold, speaking particularly of spendthrift provisions rather than postponements
of enjoyment, predicted that the American courts would follow Gray s viewpoint, and would
reject the English decisions dealing with restraints upon a married woman's estate. GRISWOLD,
SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS § 293 (2d ed. 1947) The one American case in which the issue was
specifically decided did in fact adopt Grays position. Tramell v. Tramell, 162 Tenn. 1, 32
S.W.2d 1025 (1930); see note 155 infra. However, with the increased attention which has
been given to the question of trust duration and indestructibility in this country, there is
reason to believe that other American courts will accept the English view and measure the
perpetuities period from the time when the trust begins to run.
103. GRAY, op. cit. supra note 82, § 121.8. Professors Kales and Gray engaged in friendly
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life, then for the benefit of A's first born son, with distribution
to be postponed until the son reached the age of forty'five, the
postponement would be good. The validity of the postponement being
measured from the time when the interest began to run, the son would
be a life in being and would not, therefore, be deprived of the trust prin-
cipal for longer than the permissible period.
If one is concerned only with the interests of the beneficiary and not
with an independent public policy which disfavors property being held
too long in trust, there is considerable logic in Gray's position. Since a
present taker must accept with equanimity any restraints which have been
unposed upon his equitable interest, a later taker should not be heard to
complain if his interest has been subjected to similar restraints. How-
ever, if one's chief concern is with the broader objectives of public policy,
it is apparent that Gray's position cannot be accepted. Interference with
the free circulation and maximum utilization of property cannot be kept
within reasonable limits if an interest vesting at the latest possible mo-
ment can in turn be subjected to postponements of enjoyment which will
endure for another period of lives in being and twenty-one years."'
It is at just this point that the theories underlying the modern ap-
proach to prolonged indestructibility begin to splinter. As previously
noted, most of the present-day writers do not regard excessive trust dura-
tion as being in itself offensive to public policy, their contention being
that only prolonged restraints against termination need be controlled by
the law.' Nevertheless, despite their predilection for viewing the trust
duration problem solely from the standpoint of the beneficiary and his
but sharp-pointed debate on this question. Kales believed that any rule which was adopted
to limit the rime during which a private trust might be indestructible should measure the
permissible period from the time the trust took effect, not from the time any particular interest
took effect. He wrote that
sound public policy requires such a result. The public policy of which the rule
against perpetuties is in part an expression, is that the testator's or settlor's control
over his property shall cease at least at the end of a period of a life in being and
twenty-one years from the death of the testator or the date of the settlement. To
allow hun to create an indestructible trust to last during a life or lives in being and
twenty-one years after a life or lives in being, willnot, it is submitted, be tolerated.
Kales, Several Problems of Gray's Rule Against Perpetutes, Second 'Edition, 20
HAiv. L REV. 192, 204 (1907).
Gray, in the third and fourth editions of his famous work, held to his position. See S
121.8. Nevertheless, showing that he was not without humor, he jauntily remarked in a
postscript to one of Kales' articles in the Harvard Law Review that the question was a
"troublesome and difficult" one. "I feel no present call to enter upon it. 'Suave, man
magno turbantibus aequora venus, E terra magnum alterius spectare laborem.' ori translating
rather freely- 'Pleasant it is, from the firm land of the common law, to watch the votaries
and victims of Cia!tin v. Claflin tossed among its rocks and quicksands.'- Gray, Note, 19
HA v. L REv. 604, 605 (1906). No doubt Grays reference to the "votaries" of Claflin
was given, as to Kales, with a light touch of malice, for Kales had written a strong defense
of Claflin. See note 93 supra.
104. See Kales' argument at note 103 supra.
105. See discussion pp. 353-56 supra.
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interests, these writers have not acknowledged the logic of Gray's position
that future estates, so far as their takers are concerned, should be amen-
able to the same restraints and postponements as present estates. They
have continued to assume that public policy is concerned only with the
beneficiary's interests and not with the broader interests of society itself,
and yet they have failed to answer the arguments set down by Gray on
the "time of measurement" issue."'s They have simply stated, without
discussion or argument, that the perpetuities period should begin to run
under a rule against prolonged indestructibility from the date when the
trust takes effect.1
0 7
Although this formulation of the rule accomplishes at least one of
its essential objectives, '° it remains inconsistent in theory with the free
termination approach to trust regulation which these same writers have
endorsed. It represents, in effect, a bastardization of the strict duration
and free termination approaches - a sort of amalgam in which the
strict duration element and broad public policy basis are officially im-
pugned but tacitly recognized at least in part. Apart from this incon-
sistency, however, and despite its failure to satisfactorily meet Gray's
arguments on the "time of measurement" issue, this formulation
of the rule against prolonged indestructibility does at least achieve a
certain harmony with the fundamental and generally recognized policy
that indirect restraints ought not to be given legal effect for a longer
period than lives in being and twenty-one years.0" And with the de-
cision made that the perpetuities period should begin to run from the
time of the trust's taking effect, the modern rule comes more easily
within its designation as a "corollary" of the Rule Against Perpetuities.11
106. Of all the discussion of this subject, the author has found only one writer who was
willing to admit that Gray's view of the "time of measurement" issue was a logical one. In
contrasting Kales and Gray's positions, this writer, after endorsing Kales position, admitted
that it "perhaps lacks the logical consistency and nicety of Gray's thesis that the period should
run 'from the beginning of the interest which is subject to the postponing clause.'" Comment,
34 MicH. L. REV. 553, 559 (1936) Another writer, taking just the opposite view, said
that Kales' position had "more regard for logic." No reasons were given for this point of
view. Cleary, supra note 92, at 400.
107 Morray states that Professor Kales' view, cited in note 103 supra, should prevail:
The fettering that is accomplished by the postponement provisions succeeds the
fettering accomplished by the creation of the children's contingent interests. The
total period of fettering by the settlor, however accomplished, should not be allowed
to exceed lives in being plus twenty-one years. The public interest that limits the
period of compulsory obedience to settlors should be proof against any multiplicity
of devices. Morray, supra note 92, at 474.
108. The rule does in fact remove the indirect restraints on the interests of individual bene-
ficiaries, or gives the beneficiaries the power to remove those restraints by their own action.
See discussion at p. 356 supra. It does not, however, assure that the interest of society in the
free circulation and utilization of property will be protected against such indirect restraints
as trustee investment conservatism.
109. See the remarks of Professor Kales quoted at note 103 supra, and the remarks of Morray
quoted at note 107 supra.
110. See note 148 nfra.
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When a Trust is "Indestructible"
An "indestructible" trust has previously been defined hs a trust
which has been created in a Claflin jurisdiction and which carries a clause
postponing enjoyment or other language sufficient to restrain termination.
This definition was given more out of convenience than out of accuracy,
for, as will be seen in the following discussion, the question of when a
trust is indestructible is a difficult one which has not yet been conclusively
resolved by the writers and the courts.
It is frequently said that England has never been troubled with the
problem of trust indestructibility because of its acceptance at an early
date of a rule permitting the beneficiaries to terminate, against the settlor's
wishes, a trust which is then held for them."' It is submitted that these
statements do not accurately reflect the situation. While it is true that the
Saunders rule gives a single beneficiary who is su urts the power to
remove his interest from trust, the rule gives no assurance that every trust
will be similarly destructible. Where there are two or more beneficiaries
whose interests are subject to a postponement of enjoyment, as in the case
of a remainder interest to a class comprised of the life taker's children,
it is settled both here" 2 and in England" 3 that all of the beneficiaries
must join in the petition for termination. If one of the beneficiaries re-
fuses to join, termination will be denied as to all. Along with this rule
goes the corollary that termination, in the absence of statute, will be
denied where all possible beneficiaries are not yet in being or cannot
be ascertained as a group."4
In view of these independent rules of trust law, the question arises
whether a trust should be regarded as "indestructible" if any single bene-
ficiary is unable to compel its termination or withdraw his interest from
the trust. In considering this question the following hypothetical case
may be used: Suppose a testator provides that certain property is to
be held in trust for the benefit of A, a bachelor, for life, then for the
benefit of A's children in fee, with instructions to the trustee to withhold
distribution of principal until the youngest of A's children reaches the
111. See, e.g., Comment, 24 TENN. L REV. 1021, 1024 (1957), where it is said that "the
problem of prolonged duration of a trust is one of American origin. In common law England
there was no occasion for a problem of the type now under consideration to arise [because
of the rule in Saunders v. Vautie rj." See also IA BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 86, § 218, at
409 (2d ed. 1951).
112. See, e.g., Ackeman v. Union & New Haven Trust Co., 90 Conn, 63, 96 Ad. 149
(1915); Hoffman v. New England Trust Co., 187 Mass. 205, 72 N.E. 952 (1905); 4 (pt.
2) BoGERT, op. cit. supra note 86, § 1002, at 494.
113. Harbin v. Masterman, [1896] 1 Ch. 351 (C.A.); see LEWIN, TRusTs 626 (15th ed.
1950). Recent legislation in England has extended some relief from these rules.
114. See, e.g., Gray v. Union Trust Co., 171 Cal. 637, 154 Pac. 306 (1915); In re Dougan,
139 Ga. 351, 77 S.E. 158 (1913); Damhoff v. Shambaugh, 200 Iowa 1155, 206 N.W 248
(1925); 4(pt. 2) BOGERT, op. ct. supra note 86, § 1002, at 498.
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age of thirty. Suppose also that A has died leaving four children,
M, N, 0 and P; that P, the youngest, has just reached twenty-one; and
that all four of the children wish to terminate the trust. In England, un-
der the holding in the Saunders case, the petition for termination would
be granted. In America, under the Claflin doctrine, the petition would
be denied. In the latter case, the wishes of the testator would prevail over
the wishes of the beneficiaries. But suppose further that the rule against
prolonged indestructibility is in force in the particular American jurisdic-
tion involved. Under this rule the postponement clause will be ineffec-
tive after a period of lives in being and twenty-one years has elapsed from
the time of the testator's death. Therefore, in the situation posed the
four children could join in forcing a termination of the trust. It is be-
cause of this power of termination which the rule gives to the beneficiaries
that the writers claim that such a rule completely vindicates public policy.
But changing the facts again, suppose now that P is the only one of the
four children who wishes to terminate the trust. In this case, the stated
rule will have no application. P is still confronted with the settled rule,
existing quite apart from the rule against prolonged indestructibility, that
holds that all beneficiaries must join in a petition for termination." 5 De-
spite the fact that the permissible period of "indestructibility" has expired,
there is no way for P to free his share of principal from the trust."6
While it can hardly be said in the latter situation that the rule
limiting indestructibility has fulfilled its stated purpose, the writers seem
to be indifferent to this problem. If public policy is defeated in such
a case, the writers that have considered the problem seem to suggest
that this is not so much because of any defect in the rule itself, but
rather because of an independent rule of trust law which lies afield of
the trust duration and indestructibility issue. Morray, for example, states
that the "natural meaning" of an indestructible trust is "a trust the
termination of which cannot be compelled by all of the living
beneficiaries.""' This indifference is unfortunate in view of the devices
115. The case of McClary v. McClary, 134 F.2d 455 (10th Cir. 1943), illustrates the situa-
tion discussed in the text. In this case the trust was to continue until such time as a malortt
of the beneficiaries signed a statement of consent to its termination. By its terms the trust
might have continued beyond the perpetuities period, and on that basis a single beneficiary
sought its termination. The court rejected this bid for termination, but never reached the
".all must join for termination" issue because of its holding that the trust did not offend
against the "Rule Against Perpetuities."
116. In extreme and unusual situations, courts sitting in equity may occasionally be prevailed
upon to terminate trusts either in whole or in part, or to find some other satisfactory remedy
for the party moving for termination. See generally 4 (pt. 2) BOGERT, op. cit. supra note
86 § 1002, at 494.
117 Morray, supra note 92, at 471. Professor Scott seems also to have adopted this attitude.
See 1 ScoTT, op. cit. supra note 92 § 62.10, at 547-48. It is now reflected in the formula-
tion of the Rule Against Prolonged Indestructibility. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRusrs
§ 62, comment o (1959).
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which may be used to circumvent the rule and render it impossible for a
single beneficiary to free his interest from trust.' For example, simply
by making a corporate trustee the beneficiary of a small share of the
trust, it may be possible for a trust draftsman to save the trust from in-
ternal attack for as long as the settlor or testator chooses. A corporate
trustee is in business to serve the interests of its clients, and if made a
partial beneficiary in a long-lasting trust arrangement could hardly be
expected to disobey the wishes of its client by joining with those benefi-
ciaries who were seeking termination of the trust.
To illustrate this situation, assume the following extreme example:
A testator appoints a corporate trustee to act as trustee for a large testa-
mentary trust settled for the benefit of the XYZ Corporation. For some
reason known only to himself, the testator does not want the principal of
the trust to be distributed until a period of 125 years has elapsed from
the time of his death; however, he does specifically intend the corporation
to take the income from the trust property during that period. With this
in mind the trust draftsman is put to the task of ensuring the continuation
of the trust for the desired period. Although he is aware that the Claflin
rule is followed in his jurisdiction, the draftsman also realizes that the
embryonic rule against prolonged indestructibility may seriously limit the
operation of Claflin. Therefore, not wishing to risk the chance that some
future court would apply this rule at the insistence of the XYZ Corpora-
tion, the draftsman, with approval of both testator and trustee, makes the
corporate trustee the beneficiary of a small share of the trust. The trustee
is made fully aware of the plan and agrees never to join with the corpo-
ration in petitioning for the termination of the trust. The result achieved
by this plan, seemingly lawful in all respects, is that the trust will not end
until the testator wanted it to end, 125 years from the time of his death.
Meanwhile, the XYZ Corporation is deprived of the trust principal, and
the policies favoring the free circulation and utilization of property are
defeated.
A Proposed Modification of the Rule Against Prolonged Indestructibility
Certainly in a case such as that posed above it cannot be said that the
proposed rule against indestructibility functions as an effective remedy to
property fettering, even under the view that public policy is concerned
only with unfettering individual interests. If any praise is there in order,
it must go to the trust draftsman not to the rule itself. Bearing in
mind this fundamental weakness in the present formulation of the rule,
it is the opinion of the writer that one slight but important modifica-
118. One writer, indeed, has gone so far as to give trust draftsmen a short course on how
to avoid and defeat the application of the rule against prolonged indestructibility. See Cleary,
Indestructible Testamentary Trusts, 43 YAE L.j. 393, 403-12 (1933).
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tion should be made to the rule before it achieves a real foothold in
the law " Under this modification, a trust would be regarded as "inde-
structible" when any single beneficiary was unable to compel its termina-
tion, and, accordingly, the rule would permit any single beneficiary to
take his interest free of trust after the perpetuties period had run its
course. The result achieved by such a modification would be that
in those cases where some but not all of the beneficiaries wanted
termination, those beneficiaries seeking termination would be able to
force a conveyance from the trustee of their respective shares of the trust
corpus. 2' Authority for such a modification may be found by analogy
in the Rule Against Perpetuities' practical mode of operation. Under
that rule the possibility of concerted action is not always enough to
satisfy the policy of the rule where, as a practical matter, concerted
action is improbable. For example, if land is conveyed to A and his
heirs with a proviso that if A's issue ever fails the land shall go to
B and his heirs, the executory interest will be declared void,' 2' even
though, ostensibly, the purpose of the rule is satisfied because of B's pres-
ent right either to release his interest to A or to join with A in a convey-
ance of a fee simple to C. Here the possibility of concerted action is not
enough to save the otherwise invalid future interest. In such cases the
rule does "not look so much at the theoretical possibility of a joint con-
veyance as to the practical improbability of it."'2 2 Numerous factors may
be present which will rule out the possibility of a joint conveyance: B may
be incompetent, or an infant, or just stubborn in his refusal to convey,
and thus the power of joint conveyance will accomplish nothing so far
as the policy of the law is concerned.' Since these same factors and
119. Although there are enough extant decisions and dicta to support a statement that a rule
against prolonged indestructibility does "exist" in the law today, that existence is at best a
tentative and embryonic one. See discussion at pp. 384-91 mira.
120. These are by no means original suggestions. Kales at an early date took for granted
the right of any single beneficiary to free his interest from trust. KALEs, op. cit. supra note
82, § 658. Professor Whiteside strongly endorsed this position, saying that "a trust for the
benefit of a class would seem to be indestructible as to the share of any cestus que trust with-
out the consent of all the others. The result is that for all practical purposes an indestructible
trust is created, which would seem to be objectionable, where the duration of the trust is not
limited to some reasonable period." Whiteside, Restrctions on the Duration of Business
Trusts, 9 CORNELL LQ. 422, 430 (1924) (Emphasis added.); see also Note, Duratton of
Indestructible and Spendthrift Trusts, 23 CORNELL L.Q. 629, 633 (1938).
121. See GRAY, op. ct. supra note 82, § 269, at 299 and cases cited therein.
122. Fraser, The Rationale of the Rule against Perpetuities, 6 MINN. L REV. 560, 573
(1922).
123. An English judge stated the proposition in this way-
If the owner in fee of an estate, or the absolute owner of any property could be
fettered from disposing of it by a springing use or executory devise or future con-
tingent interest which might not arise till after the period allowed by the rule, it
would be easy to tie up property for a very long time indeed. The present interest
under the executory limitations might be vested in an infant, a lunatic, or in a
person who would refuse to release it, and thus the estate would be practurally in-
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same improbability may be present when a trust settled for several
beneficiaries has endured beyond the permissible period, it is submitted
that a rule designed to limit indestructibility cannot rely on the possi-
bility that the trust will be ended by virtue of the " oncerted action of
all the beneficiaries. The approach of "practicality" lying at the core
of the Rule Against Perpetuities ought also to lie at the core of any rule
against prolonged indestructibility - which all of the writers concede to
be a corollary of the earlier rule. The fact that a settled rule of trust law
would require modification should not give reason for hesitation. The
Claflin rule is also a settled rule of trust law, yet that has not prevented
the formulation of a rule limiting indestructibility.
The Effect of the Rule Against Prolonged Indestructibility
There is still another point of controversy which has attended the
"drafting" of the rule against prolonged indestructibility. That point con-
cerns the effect which is to be given a clause which attempts to restrain
termination for a period longer than lives in being and twenty-one
years. Should such a clause be declared void ab intzo, thereby giving
the beneficiary the right to terminate the trust at any time even though
the perpetuities period has not elapsed, or should the clause be allowed
to stand until the permissible period has run its course? On this ques-
tion, as on most of the others in the duration area, the courts and the
writers are in conflict. By numerical tabulation it would appear that
most of the courts and writers have accepted the former view. The de-
cisions have dearly shown that bent,124 as has much of the scholarly com-
mentary. Kales it will be remembered joined Gray in this view; he said
that a clause calling for too long a period of indestructibility should be
"wholly void." 2' And Morray, a more recent observer, endorsed this
view by stating that "to provide an effective sanction against attempting
prolonged indestructibility, the provision should be held entirely nugatory
if it exceeds the legal limit.""'28 While this position has much to com-
mend it, recent developments seem to foreshadow a wider acceptance of
the second, or "lopping-off," view. The Restatement (Second), Trusts,
for example, has specifically adopted the latter view, adding its own minor
qualification:
A provision, express or implied, in the terms of the trust that the
trust shall not be terminated is effective where the trust is limited
in duration to lives in being and twenty-one years. Where, how-
alienable for a period long beyond the prescribed limit. That is clearly not the
law. London & S.W Ry. Co. v. Gomm, [1882) 20 Ch. D. 562, 573. (Emphasis
added.)
124. See cases discussed at pp. 386-88 wfra.
125. See KALES, op. cit. supra note 93, § 737
126. Morray, supra note 92, at 476.
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ever, the trust is to continue beyond that period, such a provision is in-
effective so far as it is applicable beyond the period, and is wholly
ineffective unless it is severable.127
Because of the general uncertainty which exists in the area of trust dura-
tion and indestructibility, future courts may be indined to adopt with re-
lief this clear-cut statement of the "lopping-off" view On the other hand,
it is possible that future courts will choose to follow what may be loosely
referred to as the "weight of authority" and declare such restraints void
ab %nitto.
Present Status of the Law Regarding Indestructibility
Few positive statements can be made in assessing existing law on the
subject of trust indestructibility The confusing legal metaphysics which
have beset the rule's formulation have accounted for as disorderly an ar-
ray of decisions and dicta as may be found in any area of the law. Totally
irreconcilable statements have been issued on the subject by different
courts and even by the same court; 2 ' and rules espoused by a court in one
case have sometimes been abjured by it in the next'29 - often without com-
ment or explanation. Moreover, those decisions which have attempted
to deal directly with the problem of indestructibility have been so differ-
ently interpreted by the experts in the field that it is difficult to determine
for just what principle of law they stand.
Despite all of this confusion, however, it can be safely said that a sub-
stantial number of reported dicta stand for the proposition that the inde-
structibility of private trusts cannot be prolonged for a period in excess of
lives in being and twenty-one years. The following are representative:
[Blut where such a restraint [against termination] is held permissible
for a limited time, it would be deemed unreasonable, and contrary to the
policy of the law, to allow it to continue beyond the period fixed by the
rule against perpetuities.130
[W]e are under the impression that in order to prevent an express
active trust from being at once subject to internal attack, it should by
either clear implication or express provision be limited in point of time
so as to comply with the rule against perpetuities 1s1
Professor Bogert has written that dicta of this character outnumber those
which suggest that there is no limitation upon the indestructibility of a
127 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRusTs § 62, comment o (1959).
128. See the discussion of the various Maryland, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania cases
at notes 5, 12 supra, and note 152 infra.
129. See, e.g., the vacillation and uncertainty which has characterized the recent North
Carolina Supreme Court decisions, discussed at note 5 supra.
130. Winsor v. Mills, 157 Mass. 362, 364, 32 N.E. 352, 353 (1892)
131. Harshbarger v. Harrison, 124 W Va. 688, 696, 22 S.E.2d 303, 307 (1942) Man)
other dicta of similar nature may be found among the reported decisions. A number of them
are collected in 1A BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 86, § 218, at 413 n.57.
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private trust" 2 Whether this statement accurately reflects the pres-
ent trend of recent decisions is almost impossible to determine. 33 A
mathematical tabulation of the holdings and dicta which have been re-
ported in the current digests might at first seem to require a different con-
clusion, for nearly all of these recite that there is no limit to which a
vested interest may be postponed. However, from a closer reading of
these recent cases it appears that in very few was the core issue of pro-
longed indestructibility actually considered by the courts. In most of
them the courts have simply held that the Rule Against Perpetuities, con-
fined as it is to the vesting of estates, cannot be invoked to invalidate a
clause unduly postponing the enjoyment of a vested estate; the question
of whether a corollary to that rule may limit the indestructibility imposed
by long-lasting postponements was not reached by the courts."3 4 Only in
a few isolated cases does it appear that any real argument against pro-
longed indestructibility was advanced by the litigants on the basis of the
public policies favoring the free circulation and maximum utilization of
property. An indication of this can be found in the recent case of Black v.
Gettys,"'3 where the court, after holding that a postponement of enjoy-
ment did not come within the purview of the Rule Against Perpetuities,
raised on its own motion the issue of prolonged indestructibility - only
to let it fall to rest again because the issue had not been argued by the
parties. The court stated:
[T]his interesting question [of prolonged indestructibility] need not
now be decided and we intimate no opinion thereabout No attack is
made on the duration of the trust as violative of public policy. Here
appellants have invoked only the common-law rule against perpetu-
ities.136
The approach in the Black case seems typical of that followed by most
courts. Although there are a few cases in which it has been held or said
that the Rule Against Perpetuities will of itself invalidate an undue post-
ponement of enjoyment relating to a vested interest, 3 ' most courts have
132. 1A BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 86, § 218, at 412-13.
133. The many situations in which the questions of indestructibility can arise has led to a
far-flung scattering of the cases under various topic headings in the current digests. For those
interested in pursuing the matter, the following subdivisions of the "Perpetuities" section in
the American Digest System are suggested: 4(12), 4(15), 4(16), 6(1), 6(2), 6(4), 6(7)
and 6(10).
134. See, e.g., Wright v. Renehan, 10 NJ. Super. 363, 76 A.2d 705 (1950); In re Newlin's
Estate, 367 Pa. 527, 80 A.2d 819 (1950).
135. 238 S.C. 167, 119 SXE.2d 660 (1961).
136. Id. at 177, 119 S.E.2d at 664.
137. See, e.g., In re Shalicross s Estate, 200 Pa. 122, 125, 49 Art. 936, 937 (1901), where
it was said: 'The trust which was created for the grandchildren during their minority was
good, but the subsequent provision of the codicil, postponing the payment until they severally
attained the age of twenty-five years, was void, as contrary to the rule of perpettuties." The
North Carolina court deciding Mercer v. Mercer, 230 N.C. 101, 52 S.E.2d 229 (1949) (note
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continued to abide by the orthodox view that the rule is concerned only
with the vesting of future interests.'38 For this reason it is difficult to pre-
dict what the attitude of the courts will be once the rule against prolonged
indestructibility achieves wider currency and is effectively employed by
counsel in the argument of cases.
The Decsions on Indestructibility
Turning to the decisions which have been said to deal directly with
the question of indestructibility, there is further evidence of the general con-
fusion in the court opinions and scholarly commentary on the proper appli-
cation and operation of the rule against prolonged indestructibility The
case of Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. on Lives v Price,'39 is a typical example.
That case was decided in 1870, nineteen years before the Claflin decision.
Nevertheless, it is universally cited as authority for the proposition that
indestructibility may not be unduly postponed by a testator. 4 ' This is
somewhat mystifying when it is remembered that the whole problem of
trust indestructibility has always been thought to have originated with
Claflin. Putting that problem aside, however, the case does have con-
siderable importance for any discussion on prolonged indestructibility
In Price a father conveyed certain real property to a trustee by inter
vivos deed, with instructions to hold the property in trust for the testator's
eight children. According to the deed, the children were to take vested
interests in fee, with distribution of their respective shares of the principal
to be made when each of them came of age. However, a proviso was
attached to this gift authorizing the trustee to withhold distribution of the
principal if in his discretion he deemed it prudent to do so. It was pro-
vided that if distribution were withheld by the trustee, he was to hold the
particular beneficiary's share of the property in trust, paying over to the
beneficiary only the income derived from his share. No provision was
made for the eventual termination of any such trust. The result of this
limitation was that each child received a share in the equitable fee, sub-
ject to the discretionary power of the trustee to forever withhold the prm-
cipal. This, in effect, amounted to a postponement of enjoyment of in-
definite duration, and in the court's opinion constituted "an attempt to
tack to the fee a condition inconsistent with its proper enjoyment."14
5 supra) also claimed that the trust in question was violative of the "Rule Against Perpetuities"
because of its capacity for excessive duration.
138. A great number of these cases are digested in 25 SIxTH DEc. DiG. Perpetutles §
4(12) (1958)
139. 7 Phila. 465 (Pa. C.P 1870)
140. See, e.g., Cleary, supra note 92, at 402; Comment, 24 TENN. L. REv. 1021, 1026
(1957).
141. Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. on Lives v. Price, 7 Phila, 465, 469 (Pa. CP. 1870)
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Viewed under these facts, it would seem that the case should have fallen
squarely within the rule of Saunders v. Vautter 42 But the court, without
commenting on that rule, went on to decide the issue of prolonged post-
ponement. It found that the power of the trustee and his successors in
office ;to :forever withhold the principal from the beneficiary was in "di-
rect c6nflict with the policy of the law which abhors a perpetuty,'14 and
held, that the postponement, not the trust itself, was therefore "null and
void:' Significantly, however, the court added that if the trustees "had
been required to exercise within a reasonable-time, that is, within the
common law period, the discretion with which they are by the terms of
the deed clothed, the present [petitioni would be without merit.' '14
This dictum suggests that the court was adopting a Claflin type rule on
indestructibility, qualified by restrictions similar to those imposed by the
"modern" rule against prolonged indestructibility 
- a remarkably ad-
vanced approach for that stage of the law's development.
Another case which is cited as authority for the rule against prolonged
indestructibility is Vatn Epps v. Arbuckle."4 5 There the trustees were to
collect the rents from certain real property held in trust and apply them
to encumbrances on that land and on certain other lands which were
owned by a party other than the trustor. Once those encumbrances had
been satisfied the trustees were to distribute the trust property to the bene-
ficiaries named in the will, unless in the trustees' discretion they deemed
it expedient to postpone distribution until some later date. No limit was
placed upon the duration of these possible postponements. From these
provisions it appeared that the testator had intended to vest in the
beneficiaries an equitable remainder in fee, subject only to the above
mentioned trust provisions. To this extent the situation presented
was not unlike that found in the Prtce case, that is to say, an absolute gift
made subject to a postponement on the beneficarles' enjoyment which
might by possibility go on indefinitely. In Van Epps, however, there
was the additional problem created by the clause calling for payment of
the encumbrances on the land. This clause appears to have contributed
importantly to the court's decision to invalidate the discretionary post-
ponement power of the trustees. Evidence was introduced by the~bene-
ficiaries, all of whomhad joined in seeking termination, that at the pres-
ent rate of income the specified encumbrances could not be satisfied for
275 years. The court would not countenance this amount of delay, and,
142. See notes 82 and 83 supra. The American courts had followed Saunders v. Vautier
prior to the decision in Calin v. CiaflUn. See GRAY, To3 RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
5 120 (4th ed. 1942).
143. Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. on Lives v. Price, 7 Phila. 465,. 468 (Pa. C.P. 1870).
144. Id. at 469.
145. 332 Ill. 551, 164 N.E. 1 (1928).
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in upholding the lower court's termination of the trust, gave the follow-
ing indication of its position:
The trust was of unlimited duration. The distribution was postponed
to such time as the trustees in their discretion might deem best or ex-
pedient. It seems clear that the devise to the trustees to distribute
being without limitation as to tune is void. It deprived the devisees
of the use of the remainder or the power to sell it to advantage until
the indebtedness mentioned was paid. The devisees had a right to
have the unlawful trust terminated, and its termination did not effect
the valid portions of the will. 146
Here again the provision allowing for an unlimited postponement of en-
joyment resulted in no postponement at all.
It appears that the Pennsylvania courts have been the most active in
dealing with the problem of indestructibility In addition to Price, there
have been two recent decisions specifically holding that undue postpone-
ments of enjoyment are repugnant to public policy The first of these,
Howard's Estate,4' might be styled the "leading decision" under the rule
against prolonged indestructibility Although the opinion is brief, it
deals squarely with the issues raised by an undue postponement of en-
joyment. The testamentary trust in that case gave the testatrix's daugh-
ter an equitable life estate with remainder over in fee to the daughter's
children, to be distributed when the youngest of them reached the age of
thirty, income to be paid to them in the meantime. The daughter died
leaving one child, a son, who at the age of twenty-five petitioned the
court to terminate the trust. This petition was granted. Noting that the
Rule Against Perpetuities was not applicable because of the absence of a
vesting issue, the court nevertheless went on to state:
[W]e believe there is, or should be, a corollary to the rule against re-
moteness of the vesting of estates or interests, a ban against a too remote
enjoyment or use; we believe such a corollary is as warranted as the rule
itself, and its basis just as logical as that of the original rule.1'48
Interestingly, the court was not at all concerned with the scant authority
for its holding. Although it did at one point cite an important dictum
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 49 it went on to say that:
The fact that there is no evidence that such a rule exists in Pennsylvama
does not bother us, for we consider ourselves competent to declare such
a rule in existence. The original rule against perpetuities was judge-
146. Id. at 558, 164 N.E. at 4.
147. 54 Pa. D. & C. 312 (Orphans Ct. 1943)
148. Id. at 314. It is evident that the case was well argued by counsel, for at one point
the court quoted with approval a passage from Kales argument on the prolongment of in-
destructibility. See note 94 supra.
149. The court referred to the dictum in Shallcross s Estate, 200 Pa. 122, 125, 49 AtL 936,
937 (1901), part of which is quoted at note 137 supra.
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made, as the crystallization of public policy; let this rule be judge-made
as well, for the same reasons.' 50
The other recent Pennsylvania case, Throm's Estate (No. 2),' also in-
volved a postponement of enjoyment attached to the equitable remainder
in fee taken by the life tenant's children. Here again, the age at which
distribution was to be made to the "children" was set at thirty. In this
case, however, the major issue was whether the remainder interest had
been intended to vest at the death of the life taker, or whether it was
contingent upon the remaindermen's reaching the prescribed age of thirty.
The court concluded, first, that the testator intended to vest the remainder
in the children and, second, that the postponement of enjoyment was in-
valid. On the latter issue, the court confined its remarks to a single
sentence:
The testamentary direction that actual payment be deferred until [the
children] should attain the age of thirty years is void as being an
illegal restraint of property in which no one but the beneficiary has an
interest.. 152
Conclustons on the Indestructibility Issue
The cases just discussed are the only ones discovered by this writer
which specifically hold that indestructibility may not be prolonged for a
period in excess of lives in being and twenty-one years. Standing alone,
they might seem of only minimal importance. However, when it is
borne in mind that there are a number of decisions which tend in the
direction taken by these cases;.53 that a majority of the dicta in this area
150. Howard's Estate, 54 Pa. D. & C. 312, 316 (Orphans' Ct. 1943).
151. 378 Pa. 163, 106 A.2d 815 (1954).
152. Id. at 169, 106 A.2d at 818, In making this statement and holding, it is likely that
the court was not consciously adopting the rule against prolonged indestructibility. It took
no particular notice that the postponement of enjoyment in this case would extend for a period
greater than lives in being and twenty-one years, and did not specifically treat the policy
questions relating to trust 'indestructibility. Moreover, it made no mention of the case of
Howard's Estate. In support of its conclusion the court cited, iter alia, Decker's Estate, 353
Pa. 509, 46 A.2d 218 (1946), a case in which a postponement, not in excess of the perpetui-
ties period, was held invalid, ostensibly on the basis of the Saunders v. Vautter doctrine,
which had found support in other Pennsylvania cases cited in that case.
As an illustraton of the confusion which abounds in this area of trust duration and inde-
structibility, both, Decker's Estate and Throm's Estate cited the dictum found in Shallcross's
Estate. See notes 137 and 141 supra. That dictum was specifically directed to the issues of
excessive postponements of enjoyment and trust indestructibility, and made no pretense of
representing the Saunders v.Vautier rule (which is not concerned with the perod of post-
ponement). This might indicate that the court inThromA's Estate was intending to make that
earlier dictum law and was not purporting to base its decision on the rule of Saunders v.
Vautier.
153. See, e.g., Southard v. Southard, 210 Mass. 347, 96 N.E. 941 (1911). The decision in
this case is obscured by the factual situation, but does stand for the proposition that a trust will
be terminated where the trust res is rendered inalienable for an "unreasonable" period. See
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appear to favor a limitation upon indestructibility;' and that there have
been exceedingly few decisions which have concluded, after due consider-
ation of the policy questions involved, that there is no need for a rule
limiting indestructibility, 5' the impression received is that there is a
marked judicial attitude favoring restriction of trust indestructibility to the
perpetuties period. This impression is made all the more real by the
significant change of position taken by the American Law Institute. In
1944, at the time of the publication of the Restatement of Property, the
Institute issued a caveat on the subject of indestructibility." 8 Although
it found that a provision calling for perpetual indestructibility was void,
and that one calling for indestructibility for only the life of a beneficiary
living at the creation of the trust was good, it refused to take a position
on any period of indestructibility falling between those two limits.'57
This was a continuation of the policy which had earlier been set down in
the Restatement of Trusts.' However, in 1959, with the publication of
the Restatement of Trusts, Second, the Institute removed the caveat and
laid down the rule that indestructibility could not be prolonged beyond
the perpetuities period as measured from the testator's death.'59
In an area where there is so little conclusive authority and so much
uncertainty, this adoption of the rule against prolonged indestructibility
by the Restatement may be expected to have a wide influence upon the
future course of the law of trusts. Even though all the features of this
also Allen Estate, 347 Pa. 364, 32 A.2d 301 (1943) (here it is not clear whether termination
was decreed because of the undue postponement of enjoyment or because of the Saunders v.
Vautier rule); Angell v. Angell, 28 R.I. 592, 68 Adt. 583 (1908).
154. See IA BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 218, at 412-13 (2d ed. 1951).
155. The one case which is universally ated for this proposition is Knecht v. George, 69
N.E.2d 228 (Ohio Ct. App. 1943), appeal dismsssed, 142 Ohio St. 635, 53 N.E.2d 647
(1944). In this case the issue was very lightly treated, the court holding only that the ap-
parent postponement (the facts were not set out in the opinion) violated neither the Rule
Against Perpetuities nor the rule against direct restraints on alienation. The court did
not mention any question of public policy relating to prolonged indestructibility, though
it is of course possible that this issue was argued by the parties.
No cases have been found which directly repudiate the rule against prolonged indestruct-
ibility after argument in support of that rule has been made by counsel. One case which
seems to disfavor any such rule (though it does not discuss the rule) is Tramell v. Tramell,
162 Tenn. 1, 32 S.W.2d 1025 (1930) In that case the court adopted Grays view that
future estates could be subjected to the same restraints to which a present estate could be sub-
jected. See discussion pp. 376-78 supra. However, unlike Gray, the court did not state that
any such restraints would have to be limited to the period of lives in being and twenty-one
years. The court said only that general equitable and trust principles might be applied where
the restraint was completely unreasonable.
156. RESTATBMENT, PROPERTY 5 381 (1944). In comment a under this section, the Insti-
tute adopted the same terminology of "external" and "internal' attack which Cleary had used.
See the discussion of these terms at note 70 supra.
157. Professor Simes remarked that this position was taken out of "abundant caution."
SIMES, FUTURE INTERESS § 1393, at 245 (2d ed. 1956).
158. Section 62, comment k (1935)
159. Section 62, comments n and o, quoted and discussed at note 127 supra.
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new rule have not been settled by the courts or the writers, the basic ap-
proach to the problem has now been definitely staked out. And while
excessive duration itself may no longer subject a trust to immediate ex-
ternal attack, despite the important social and economic reasons for sus-
taining such external attacks, 6 ' it is now quite clear that a well-presented
argument on behalf of the beneficiaries may expose a trust to internal
attack:and termination once the perpetuities period has expired.
160. See discussion pp. 352-71 supra.
